

## Werk

**Titel:** Managing and marketing of urban development and urban life  
**Untertitel:** proceedings of the IGU-Commission on "Urban Development and Urban Life", Berlin, August 15 to 20, 1994  
**Jahr:** 1994  
**Kollektion:** fid.geo  
**Signatur:** XX  
**Digitalisiert:** Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen  
**Werk Id:** PPN1030505985  
**PURL:** <http://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?PPN1030505985>  
**OPAC:** <http://opac.sub.uni-goettingen.de/DB=1/PPN?PPN=1030505985>  
**LOG Id:** LOG\_0127  
**LOG Titel:** Urban strategies: Mega events. A Copenhagen perspective.  
**LOG Typ:** article

## Übergeordnetes Werk

**Werk Id:** PPN1030494754  
**PURL:** <http://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?PPN1030494754>  
**OPAC:** <http://opac.sub.uni-goettingen.de/DB=1/PPN?PPN=1030494754>

## Terms and Conditions

The Goettingen State and University Library provides access to digitized documents strictly for noncommercial educational, research and private purposes and makes no warranty with regard to their use for other purposes. Some of our collections are protected by copyright. Publication and/or broadcast in any form (including electronic) requires prior written permission from the Goettingen State- and University Library.  
 Each copy of any part of this document must contain there Terms and Conditions. With the usage of the library's online system to access or download a digitized document you accept the Terms and Conditions.  
 Reproductions of material on the web site may not be made for or donated to other repositories, nor may be further reproduced without written permission from the Goettingen State- and University Library.

For reproduction requests and permissions, please contact us. If citing materials, please give proper attribution of the source.

## Contact

Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen  
 Georg-August-Universität Göttingen  
 Platz der Göttinger Sieben 1  
 37073 Göttingen  
 Germany  
 Email: [gdz@sub.uni-goettingen.de](mailto:gdz@sub.uni-goettingen.de)

## **URBAN STRATEGIES: MEGA EVENTS. A COPENHAGEN PERSPECTIVE**

**Hans Thor Andersen and Christian Wichmann Matthiessen**  
University of Copenhagen, Denmark

This paper presents two mega events as tools in the strategic planning of the Copenhagen area. Due to growing inter-metropolitan competition, increasingly offensive and complex means are applied. This demands strong leadership, stable long term planning and willingness to accept the costs in order to reach the objectives. Marketing versus strategic planning is discussed. The general position of Copenhagen in the European urban system gives perspective to a potential change on the South Scandinavian urban scene. New instruments of strategic planning in Greater Copenhagen are introduced. The competitive level of Copenhagen is analyzed in relation to Stockholm, Berlin and Hamburg. Two examples of mega events are discussed that represent typical elements in urban competition: cultural events and infrastructure improvements. 1) Copenhagen as 'The Cultural City of Europe' in 1996 represents a temporary mega event. 2) The planned bridge between Copenhagen and the south Swedish city of Malmö, combined with Swedish entrance into EU, opens up for development of the first cross-national integrated large-city region outside the European centre. This is an example of a mega event which will alter the scene permanently. Both events are important issues used in developing a growth strategy for Greater Copenhagen. But neither the cultural city nor the bridge may by themselves guarantee any advantages. It depends upon the ability of local actors to develop and promote the quality of their city.

**Key Words:** Urban Geography, Strategic Planning, Urban Marketing, Copenhagen, the Öresund Region, Fixed Links, Culture.

Urban marketing means to think and act from the point of view of customers (BERG et al, 1990). To be successful, funds, instruments, strategies and activities must be planned and controlled to satisfy the needs of different groups of customers. The traditional entrepreneurial management decision process focusing on product, price, distribution, promotion, staff and policy could in principle be applicable to the urban or regional product. The purpose of such an orientation is to run the town or region in the best interest of its inhabitants. But company management is much more simple than urban or regional management. First of all the urban product differs from other products by complexity, lack of flexibility and durability. Secondly most urban units are the core of larger functional regions, and their administrative composition seldom mirrors the appropriate region for marketing. As a marketing or strategical level, the functional urban region would be preferred to the municipality or county. Thirdly the managers of an urban or regional unit only control parts of the product whereas companies and other organizations could be considered as co-managers. The influence of local government is largely limited to providing infrastructure and services. Fourthly the responsibility of local government to balance widely different group interests in itself prevents business-like strategies and objectives.

Urban marketing is an not clearly defined process based on theory developed with other purposes. The object is often considered to be the attraction of new customers to the urban product. The customers are defined as investors or visitors. The overall object is to attract and maintain activity. Strategic planning shares instruments and views with urban marketing, but the objectives are differently defined as the formulation and achievement of a new and better role on the urban scene for the city concerned. The overall object is consequently not only to attract and maintain activity, but also to improve the urban product for example by development of infrastructure and attracting highly skilled expertise.

The original advantages of agglomeration have slowly but constantly been reduced. Today high speed and densely developed networks for telecommunication, person- and goods-transportation dominate. Most locations are accessible to import and export of standardized products and information. Large city regions are under transformation into a post-industrial structure. Qualified large city regions have no comparative advantages for simple industrial production. The real advantages of agglomeration are found in contacts with customers in the transferring of knowledge and in the fabric of decision making.

The process of planning and managing urban units is influenced by the transformation of the urban system. Traditional urban hierarchies based on territorially identified networks change into network societies where hinterlands become of decreasing importance. The dominance of high ranking central places may fall, as positioning in a series of networks gives new opportunities to cities favoured by nodal, multimodal or intermodal characteristics. Internationalization, change into a society where information and creativity are of importance, and rising weight of network position alter the risk pattern and thereby create new demands for active urban policy of marketing and strategic planning.

The traditional way of competition, e.g. by selling off cheap land for industrial uses, by keeping wages low etc., does not improve the structural relations of a city, which consequently will be unable to profit from such activities. In order to cope with the changing preconditions, most cities have modernised their activities. Privatization, public-private partnerships, local economic development and infrastructure development are typical ingredients. Only localities that actively fight for their future will have one. Often, this form of urban policy consists of a combination of cooperation and competition with other cities. The European urban scene is in focus and new types of strategies are searched for. Accelerated competition puts stronger demands on leadership and managing.

### **The European urban scene**

Europe has around 500 urban agglomerations of more than 100,000 inhabitants (estimate). In Table 1, the largest European urban agglomerations are presented, see ANDERSSON & MATTHIESSEN (1993). They are delimited in the same way all over

Europe as functional, consolidated urban areas. All agglomerations have been identified as "greater-" urban units on the basis of detailed topographical maps. The data are the latest available and are estimated on the basis of various statistics. A homogenous method of estimate has been given priority. Eastern European estimates are more uncertain than Western European estimates.

Table 1 Large urban agglomerations around 1990. Population and "gross agglomeration product"

Population (mio. inhb.)		"Gross agglomeration product" (bio. US \$)	
Rhein-Ruhr	10,4	Rhein-Ruhr	205
Paris	8,7	Paris	164
Moscow	8,6	London	125
London	7,7	Randstad	87
Randstad	5,6	Milan	61
St. Petersburg	4,9	Manch.-Liverpool	54
Madrid	4,4	Frankfurt	53
Manch.-Liverpool	4,1	Moscow	46
Milan	3,6	Sheffield-Leeds	45
Barcelona	3,4	Rome	42
Sheffield-Leeds	3,4	Birmingham	40
Katowice	3,3	Stuttgart	39
Berlin	3,1	Hamburg	39
Athens	3,0	Barcelona	37
Rome	3,0	Berlin	34
Birmingham	2,7	Copenhagen	34
Frankfurt	2,7	Munich	34
Budapest	2,5	Vienna	33
Kiev	2,4	Madrid	31
Naples	2,4	Stockholm	29
Warsaw	2,1	Zurich	28
Lisbon	2,1	Turin	27
Stuttgart	2,0	St. Petersburg	24
Hamburg	2,0	Naples	24
Vienna	2,0	Mannheim	24
Bucharest	1,9	Glasgow	22
Glasgow	1,7	Helsinki	21
Munich	1,7	Brussels	20
Turin	1,6	Hannover	20
Prague	1,6	Lyon	19
Kharkov	1,6	Genoa	17
Copenhagen	1,6	Marseilles	17
Stockholm	1,6	Nürnberg	17
Minsk	1,5	Gothenburg	17
Oporto	1,4	Oslo	16
Belgrade	1,4	Bremen	16
Brussels	1,3	Athens	16
Valencia	1,2	Lille	15
Brno	1,2	Newcastle	15
Chemnitz	1,2	Saarbrücken	15

The other type of size indicator listed in Table 1 is also an estimate. Estimates of "gross agglomeration product" are based on data on population, gross national and regional products, and on delimitation of the urban units. Compared with the ranking of agglomerations according to population size, East- and South European cities demonstrates lower ranks, North European cities higher.

Air traffic is a highly important link between superior international activities. Besides tourists, important users of the air network are decision-makers, knowledge handlers, administrators, and other advanced personnel. Table 2 presents international passenger traffic measured in terms of embarking and disembarking persons. The urban agglomeration is the unit so if there is more than one airport in a city (as for instance in London) their figures are totaled. The figures indicate potential accessibility to the very important network of decision making. London has an outstanding lead, with traffic twice the size of "number two". Three cities follow: Paris, Frankfurt and Randstad. A third level consists of 7 units: Zürich, Copenhagen, Rhein-Ruhr, Rome, Palma, and Manchester. East European centres are almost absent and North Europe is over-represented.

More and more urban activities can be described as being knowledge and information-based. Investment and employment increasingly reflect the transformation of the economy from being capital-intensive to information-intensive (CAPELLO & NIJKAMP 1991). An increasing number of activities are now associated with the production, collection, manipulation, storage, and distribution of information. Innovation is a strategic resource for firms and is closely connected with urban growth. ANDERSSON & STRÖMQUIST (1989) have given the label "creativity" to this growing base of wealth production. Creativity is defined as the production and handling of technical, cultural, social, and organizational innovations. Communication capacity, cognitive skill, knowledge availability, and the supply of creative and cultural capacities are development factors. Excellence in all areas is a principal growth factor. Rapid development is favoured by universities and other research facilities, and by advanced and efficient telecommunication networks, other information technology equipment, and fast passenger transport systems. The increasing importance of the creativity sector is associated with the renewal of the economic system in Europe towards dynamic product competition. ANDERSSON and MATTHIESSEN (1993) have presented a new study of the creativity base of large European agglomerations (see Table 2). The data are papers from the 3000 most cited refereed scientific periodicals within natural science, medicine and technical science, 1988-91, registered by institutional address of author. London is the European leader followed by Paris, Moscow and Randstad. The next level consists of Stockholm, Rhein-Ruhr, Brussels, Glasgow, Frankfurt, Manchester, Birmingham, Copenhagen, Munich, Berlin, and Cambridge. It is interesting to note that these centres of scientific production are very concentrated to Northwestern Europe. Only Moscow is an exception to this and no other Eastern or Southern European agglomeration produces scientific output proportional to their mass measured as population.

Table 2 Large urban agglomerations around 1990. International air traffic and scientific output

Embarked plus disembarked air passengers 1989 (*1000)		Scientific output articles 1988-91	
London	55009	London-Oxford	115500
Paris	27441	Paris	86921
Frankfurt	19532	Moscow	75292
Randstad	15507	Randstad	42702
Zurich	10999	Stockholm-Uppsala	29480
Copenhagen	9098	Rhein-Ruhr	28989
Rhein-Ruhr	9010	Brussels-Antwerpen	27509
Rome	8498	Glasgow-Edinburgh	23980
Palma	8415	Frankfurt-Mainz	23955
Manchester	8139	Manchester-Liverpool	23842
Brussels	6869	Birmingham-Nottingham	22786
Madrid	6564	Copenhagen	22110
Milan	6303	Munich	21862
Athens	6234	Berlin	20396
Munich	6128	Cambridge	19394
Stockholm	6086	Bristol-Cardiff	17896
Moscow	5413	St. Petersburg	17254
Helsinki	5098	Milan-Pavia	17223
Vienna	4706	Heidelberg-Karlsruhe	17179
Dublin	4692	Sheffield-Leeds	15800
Geneva	4583	Kiev	15100
Malaga	3844	Madrid	15034
Oslo	3490	Stuttgart	15026
Lisbon	3413	Rome	14911
Barcelona	3002	Geneva-Lausanne	14145
Hamburg	2893	Nijmegen-Eindhoven	13596
Birmingham	2608	Helsinki	12897
Lanarca	2535	Bologna-Parma	12571
Budapest	2367	Zurich	12276
Faro	2273	Malmö-Lund	12265
Alicante	2215	Aachen-Liege	11960
Stuttgart	2200	Vienna	11261
Ibiza	1969	Barcelona	11005
Nice	1856	Grenoble	10460
Malta	1779	Basel-Mulhouse	9722
Prague	1767	Budapest	9426
Lyon	1748	Warsaw	9119
Gothenburg	1622	Prague	9079
Marseilles	1621	Gothenburg	8786
Glasgow	1548	Newcastle	8706

Capital cities have been defined in many ways, and capital cities are certainly a category in the urban system. Their status is given by the centrality concerning political functions. They are often large or even primate. But they also display functions which are general for the urban system. Decision power is an important performance of metropolitan cities and especially of capital cities. Decision power is defined as the ability to control spatial-economic development, administrative-



political circumstances, and conditions of daily life for persons and firms. The category of capital cities is in itself an interesting object for research. VAN DER WUSTEN (1993) lists an additional set of reasons to look anew at capital cities. He raises the question if capital cities as a category have some advantages or disadvantages in the newly structured environment of direct urban competition.

Many studies of the European urban scene have recently been published. The first in this new sequence was the famous series of maps and conclusions (The European "Banana") presented by RECLUS (1989). The grouping of the 154 largest Western European cities is based on comprehensive data ranging from population, jobs, firms, and infrastructure, to research, finance, traffic, culture, meetings and the press. The general ranking synthesizes the many data by adding the different rank-scores. The 154 cities are categorised in 8 classes. London and Paris are the leaders and constitutes class 1. Milan is the only member of class 2. Class 3 comprises 7 cities; Madrid, Munich, Frankfurt, Rome, Brussels, Barcelona and Amsterdam. The fourth class with 11 members includes Manchester, Berlin, Hamburg, Stuttgart, Copenhagen, Athens, Rotterdam, Zurich, Turin, Lyon and Geneva. The French study does not include Finland, Norway, and Sweden, but would probably add Stockholm to class 4 if those countries were included.


The cities could be ranked differently. PALOMÄKI (1991) identifies a hierarchy of Western European decision-making centres on the basis of ranking a series of activities. He finds three leaders, London, Paris and Brussels, followed by a group of 17 important centres, and a number of centres of minor importance. The second group includes from top to bottom Geneva, Randstad, Stockholm, Frankfurt, Munich, Copenhagen, Rome, Vienna, Moscow, Strasbourg, Zurich, Oslo, Helsinki, Madrid, Luxembourg, Milan and Hamburg.

CORTIE (1993) discusses the new urban order based on the global division of labour within networks of urban regions. It is no longer the central location within a region that determines a city's function, but the degree of its participation in the international division of labour. The concentration of power to capitals of strong and centralized nations is counteracted by deconcentration demands from less powerful nations, who want their share of decision units in corporations and organizations. By virtue of advances in technology and transportation, many functions have become independent of place. In the new urban order decentralization of political, economic and cultural functions are accelerated. CORTIE uses data from the studies by RECLUS and PALOMÄKI to analyze the centrality, versus the network position of European capitals. He finds most capital cities to be pre-eminent, national central places. He views the decision-making triangle comprising Brussels, London and Paris as a network with a distinct division of functions. London is the economic point of gravity. Brussels is the centre for all kinds of organizations, and political organizations in particular. Paris has a mixed structure.

There is no general agreement on a formal definition of metropolitan status but many would consent to a definition as the one presented here. Metropolitan functions are: communication node, financial centre, culture, entertainment, top level

private services, science, higher education, and economic leadership. Metropolitan units are the focal points of the exchange of communication and the exercise of competition. They have the capacity for innovation and adaptation. Metropolitan urban product are of high quality and it is often within these units that person productivity is highest and income is above average. On the basis of this kind of functional definition and on the data listed in Tables 1 and 2, it is estimated that 25 European urban units can be characterized as metropolis. Operational definition: urban agglomerations larger than 1 million inhabitants with a combined percentage of total GNP, percentage of international air passengers and percentage of scientific output which give a rank among the 25 agglomerations ranking highest. The thus defined metropolitan units are indicated on the map in Figure 1.

Figure 1 European Metropolises (for definition see text). European Center indicated (RECLUS 1989)





Symbol size is proportional with the scores. On the map the European economic centre is also indicated. This centre is delimited according to RECLUS (1989) and comprehends 50 percent of all economic activity of the continent. Within the European centre 13 of Europe's 25 metropolitan units are found. They are interdependent and competing. The labour markets overlap and the urban functions (for instance airports) are often shared between cities. Hinterlands are not clearly delimited. Many large units are strongly specialized and there is a certain amount of division of labour between cities. There is no clear urban hierarchy. The metropolitan areas are congested, environments are under press, and prices of land are very high. Many disadvantages of agglomeration are obvious. Outside the central parts of Europe the network of large units with metropolitan status is less dense. To the north and east there are: Glasgow-Edinburgh, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg and Moscow. To the south there are Madrid, Barcelona, Rome and Athens. Each of these cities dominates large areas and urban hierarchy is obvious.

The post-1991 European urban scene is a scene of both growth and decline. It is a scene of turbulence and of changing potential. Some of the old patterns of growth location will break down, although the European centre will take on its share of new activity. The disadvantages of agglomeration (congestion, land prices, pollution) are a problem, especially in the European centre. Other growth centres will be identified as promising. This will be the case for metropolitan and capital units with large, rich regions outside the traditional centre. New areas, such as in Eastern Europe, will be given the status of peripheral areas and receive subsidies, while the old peripheral regions of the Atlantic fringe and South-eastern Europe will lag further behind. A possible downturn in the Mediterranean growth might be expected as investors shift their focus from south to east. A regionalization of Eastern Europe is a realistic alternative to pre-1991 centralization.

Some of the large units of Europe have the potential to change and experience rapid growth. This is a consequence of new qualities and characteristics, and Berlin is an obvious example as the coming capital of Germany. Lille, as the planned node of the TGV-system, as well as a series of airport towns, becoming the new gateways to Eastern Europe, are other examples of such new characteristics. The capitals of new nations will evolve and take their place in the first line of important centres. Finally, there is Copenhagen with a high potential growth closely connected to a shift in role on the North European scene. This will be discussed later.

### **Competitors: Copenhagen, Berlin, Hamburg and Stockholm**

The principal competitors on the North European urban scene are the four metropolis Berlin, Hamburg, Copenhagen and Stockholm. They also compete with other European metropolis, with the European centre and with cities like Helsinki, Oslo and centres of minor importance. Berlin, Copenhagen and Stockholm are old

national capitals with all the advantages it gives, and Hamburg is a non-capital city. Berlin is the largest of the four cities, but has just recently become capital of the reunited Germany. Berlin itself is also reunited, a fact that causes many practical as well as social and political problems in the city. In the following the competition levels of these four urban units are discussed.

The four cities have been analyzed in the project "Big city competition in the Baltic Sea region", (ANDERSEN & JØRGENSEN 1994) according to three main dimensions consisting of firstly the socio-economic basis of the city - its industries, their technological level, the transition from manufacturing to service economy (restructuring of the economic base), composition of the economy, the economic level, infrastructure, labour market, educational structure, social structure and living conditions in general. Secondly, the functional role of a city, i.e. main activities - communications, advanced services, manufacturing, exchange, consumption, research and development etc. - in relation to national and international markets. And thirdly, the political and administrative structures of the city. A brief overview based on the project is presented below:

*Berlin* has a weak industrial base as public services and administration have a dominant position and as most of the private businesses has survived primarily due to substantial subsidies. As a consequence industrial development, with regard to structure, technology and competence, has not kept pace with Western Europe. The special circumstances of the reunification of Berlin have led to an almost total deindustrialization of Eastern Berlin (more than 160.000 jobs have been lost in only 3 years) with an overwhelming increase in unemployment as a result. The infrastructure of the city is problematic due to deficiencies in capacity as well as quality. Improvements are underway, but there is uncertainty about the location of the new airport and high speed lines. The transition from manufacturing to a service economy has in reality been heavily financed by government subsidies.

Berlin has just recently regained its formal position as German capital. But this will only be a minor compensation for the loss of its former position - e.g. as pre-war German and post-war East-German centre of banking and insurance, media, national headquarters for a large number of leading firms within manufacturing and trade, research and education etc. In fact, Berlin is in a paradoxical situation, as its functions - despite its size - are mainly of provincial level. Due to the special circumstances of Berlin after 1945, the city has an exceptional international position.

Berlin, with its present borders, was formed in 1920 as a result of annexation of suburban areas in order to guarantee coordinated planning and development. Today, urban development has passed these borders, and consequently planners attempt to coordinate the cross-border development. This is a difficult task, since both Berlin and Brandenburg are *Länder* with a high level of autonomy - also with regard to urban and regional planning. In combination with a underdeveloped leadership capacity and a missing or weak strategy this has prevented successful restructuring.

Moreover, the reunification of two different political and administrative systems in Berlin itself has further complicated planning and governance.

*Copenhagen* has passed through the process of deindustrialization and compensated this by successful expansion in advanced services. However, since the mid-1980s this positive trend has been broken and as a result, unemployment has grown remarkably. The economic base is in general broad and of a full international standard. Existing manufacturing industry is dominated by advanced production. Private services have expanded and research and higher education are of international quality. The infrastructure of the city is well developed, but needs modernization and extension. Housing is of high standards, and housing deficit has disappeared recently. Social problems, however, due to the high unemployment in inner city areas have become visible.

Thanks to the broad economic base and the function as national capital, Copenhagen has been able to develop into an important centre for research, finance, culture, international organisations and communications. The city possesses a clear international profile.

The tumults of metropolitan government (Greater Copenhagen Council was abolished 1990) have removed the coordinating and decisive level of government for the whole region. At the same time, the City of Copenhagen has been unable to pursue long-term planning due to internal political struggles. As a consequence Copenhagen has had a under-developed leadership capacity and strategic planning has only recently been initiated.

*Hamburg* is an old merchant republic, whose main focus has been on overseas trade. The city has first-class transport links by sea, road and rail. The airport is of only regional interest, but still growing. There is a steady improvement of infrastructure. The industrial base of the city has always been the port-oriented industries, but Hamburg aimed at restructuring its economy from the mid 1980s by developing a high tech sector (e.g. production of Airbus). Although its overall welfare level is among the highest in Europe, housing shortage and growing social differences have become widespread.

Until the late 1940s Hamburg was only a city of regional importance (with the exception of sea transport). But the post-war Berlin outmigration of banks, insurance, newspapers, publishers, national headquarters of private firms, etc. turned Hamburg into a more diversified city with research and service functions for Northern Germany. The city has a dominant position into several key sectors in Germany, but has a surprisingly low level of internationalization.

As a German *Land*, Hamburg has much more autonomy than most other cities. In combination with the narrow borderlines, however, common plans for the metropolitan area are a complicated political-administrative matter. The leadership capacity is well-developed, but the complexity of the formulated strategy limited.

*Stockholm* is located in the periphery of Europe, but has a high level of economic development. Infrastructure is strongly developed, and further improvements are in progress. The airport has a medium position internationally, but new investments are still large. The city has been able to restructure its economic base with great success in the 1970s and 1980s. Today economy in Stockholm is dominated by services and has a high level in research, education and technology. The economic recession caused a sharp rise in unemployment from 1990. The housing standard is the highest even on a global scale and there is no shortage.

Like Copenhagen, Stockholm has been national capital for centuries, hence a number of national functions - banking, insurance, administration, research & education, communications - are concentrated in the city. Due to the structure of private business, Stockholm has a number of headquarters for private firms of international importance. Despite the high technical standard of all kinds of communications, the peripheral location gives Stockholm a real and an image problem.

The political and administrative structure has fit well to a coordinated planning and development of the city. At present, however, this structure is unsuitable for both the competition between the large cities of Europe and for the handling of present industrial crisis. Both requires a fundamental change in policy style.

To sum up, all four cities have passed through the process of deindustrialization and completely or partly compensated this by expanding the service sector. Stockholm and Hamburg have done best, while Copenhagen and Berlin have structural and employment problems. However, since the early 1990s Stockholm and Hamburg have also seen economic stagnation or decline with a sharply rising rate of unemployment as a result.

While Berlin, more or less automatically thanks to its new function as united German capital, will certainly gain a more significant position, Hamburg has, despite proper attempts, not been able to internationalise its functions. Neither Copenhagen nor Stockholm have during the last few years changed their international function.

In metropolis, leadership capacity is limited (Hamburg being an exception) and a broad, coherent and complex regeneration strategy is normally absent or only weakly formulated. While the federal structure of Germany gives Berlin and Hamburg some advantages, e.g. more autonomy, it also creates barriers for cross-border coordination and cooperation within its functional urban regions. In the case of Copenhagen, the abolition of the metropolitan council left the capital region without coordination, planning and common policy. Moreover, it seems that the Danish parliament primarily considers Copenhagen as a national burden and has weakened the city to the advantage of the provinces. This is in sharp contrast to Stockholm where national government has supported the restructuring of the city and clearly considers Stockholm as the main locality for economic development.

## **New instruments of strategic planning in Greater Copenhagen**

As in many other metropolitan units the leaders of Copenhagen have recently adopted urban marketing and strategic planning. As in most other urban places this has by no means been done wholeheartedly. At best, one can identify fragments of such activities. Planning and strategy formulation still are in the hands of the 50 municipalities and 5 counties of Greater Copenhagen. But new organizations have been established covering the whole region and given responsibilities and means. This has been done as cooperative operations with municipal, county and national government participation and also with private business and organizations as partners. "Wonderful Copenhagen" is a new organization which has the objective to attract tourists and "Copenhagen Capacity" is a parallel organization focusing on investments. The organizations were established in 1993 with yearly budgets of 2-4 millions ECU each, and with larger budgets in forthcoming years.

The establishment of small cooperative private-public partnerships could be forerunners of more whole-hearted policies of urban marketing and strategic planning. Nevertheless, almost as a gift come the two mega-events presented in this paper. Both were initiated with little reference to the future of Greater Copenhagen. The Danish capital was the 12th and last of the cultural cities of EU, and the decision on a fixed link across the Sound was the consequence of general European transportation problems. The two events have gradually become major instruments under the marketing and strategic planning umbrella. Cultural City '96 has a budget of 150 millions ECU and is partly seen as a means to concentrate world attention on Copenhagen cf. Olympic Games. The fixed link between Denmark and Sweden entails large local and regional potential of change and growth. This is seen as a strategic possibility which can alter the European role of Copenhagen. A fusion of Copenhagen and the large Swedish agglomerations of Malmö and Lund is a realistic consequence of the fixed link. A take-off to a more sizeable and dominant role is an expected result.

## **Temporary mega-event: Copenhagen the Cultural City of Europe 1996**

The European City of Culture is an annual EU-event first realized in Athens (1985) and followed by Florence (1986) and Amsterdam (1987). In 1990, Glasgow became the European City of Culture. While the former cultural cities had used the position for interesting exhibitions and festivals, the city of Glasgow formulated a total concept for the event covering all aspects for a whole year; a much more ambitious programme than those of previous cities of culture. The cultural event was an integrated part of the urban regeneration strategy of Glasgow. In many respects, the Glasgow event has been used as a model for Copenhagen.

Glasgow was severely hit by the process of deindustrialization. An enormous job loss (nearly 100.000 jobs disappeared between 1971 and 1983), high and growing



unemployment rate (est. 25%) and very visible decay. The city got a most negative image, e.g. from *second city of the empire* to *cancer of the empire* (BOYLE & HUGHES 1991). This forced the city government to reconstruct the image of Glasgow. The first step was the launch of the *Glasgow Miles Better* - promotional campaign and the creation of Greater Glasgow Tourist Board. A few years later, this was followed by *There's A Lot Glasgowing On In 1990* (DAMER 1990). Moreover, the city turned its renewal efforts towards the city centre despite great need in peripheral estates. Some of the more important campaigns are the GEAR-project (*Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal*) on the fringe of the city, the rehabilitation of Merchant City, once a derelict warehouse area close to the city, and the restoration of several smaller locations along the river Clyde. These projects were further supported by cultural developments, e.g. the Burrell Collection, the Mayfest and proposals for a new concert hall and a new Royal College of Music and Drama. By the establishment of *Glasgow Action*, the public - private partnership formed around some of the most prominent businessmen of the city, private leadership was injected into the revitalisation. Totally more than 50 million £ had been spent for over 3800 cultural activities. The Year of Culture 1990 was a most important platform for the city as it both provided a general frame for the prior regeneration projects and introduced the use of culture and arts as a component of economic planning and development. The massive efforts have brought about results of a more permanent kind - first of all the improved image, which makes possible attraction of investments, but also jobs in tourist-related industries. This development strategy has been strongly attacked by the left opposition, which claim it was more power than culture, a kind of treason against the working class.

The RECLUS study (1989) presented the profile of Copenhagen as a city with high scores regarding the international dimension, culture and research. The city comes close to cultural primacy on the national Danish scene and concentrates the institutions, of which the nation has only one, for example the Royal Theatre, the Royal Library, the National Museum, the National Museum of Art, and various academies and collections. Copenhagen also contains a wide variety of public and private institutions under the heading of culture, and presents formal as well as informal activities of all kinds ranging from Tivoli Gardens to strange subcultures. Although the concept of 'European Cultural City' indicates a temporary event, local benefit will increase by implementation of long-term initiatives. Thus, the Cultural City of Copenhagen intends to use the occasion to create durable improvements.

The event of Copenhagen as the European Cultural City of 1996 includes a broad, well-prepared programme for culture in general, which also contains local arrangements in different parts of the city, international workshops, seminars and a number of organized, informal meetings with internationally leading artists. Moreover, the infrastructure of culture will be improved with new institutions and expansion or modernization of existing ones. In total a very ambitious attempt to raise the 'cultural level' of Copenhagen. Nevertheless, intentions go further. The 1996-event is seen as a support to restructure the economy of Copenhagen from a postindustrial service



economy to an economy based on advanced services with creativity, communication, culture and knowledge of high international quality.

The Cultural City '96 itself is organized according to three dimensions (Kulturbysekretariatet, 1993). The geographical dimension of the city represents the physical form, character and quality (architectural and environmental) of the city, the region and its various parts in a national and international context. The human dimension focus on the resources of individuals and social groups, their creativity, traditions, values, abilities and habits. The art dimension covers creativity and mediation within all kinds of cultural activity, for example among artists or cultural institutions.

The intentions of the project are first of all related to cultural activities - e.g. to increase commitment to arts and culture, to increase the level of Danish culture through internationalization, to make permanent improvements for arts, to focus on international tendencies and to make culture and arts more visible in daily life. Another important objective is to promote metropolitan Copenhagen by focusing on its geographical, historical and physical qualities.

The development of such objectives has clear positive effects on the local economy. The event will change the qualities of Copenhagen in the direction of a creative society, which means a further modernization of infrastructure and a new activity pattern. A successful progress of Cultural City '96 will be important to the regional identity of metropolitan Copenhagen. It demonstrates a practical effort in regional cooperation, and could thus be a forerunner in the ongoing process of establishing some kind of regional government. On the marketing level, presentation of the event will strengthen the image of the city as a major metropolis on the Baltic Sea scene, and the event in itself provides a better basis to market the region externally. Exploitation of the potential through tourism, congresses, international exhibitions and the like, presents a real chance for new synergetic growth.

### **Permanent mega-event: the bridge to Sweden and the potential establishment of a cross-national integrated big-city region**

South Scandinavian geography represents a crossroads scene. The straits between the Baltic Sea and the oceans of the world delimit the Danish islands and the peninsulas of Jutland and Scandinavia. Seagoing traffic is intense and is expected to increase when the East European nations catch up in international trade. Three of the Scandinavian straits are considered as missing fixed links. They are the Storebelt link between the islands of Zealand and Funen (Funen is linked to the European continent by bridges), the Sound between Zealand and Sweden, and the Femarbelt between Zealand and the German island of Femar (Femar is linked to the European continent by a bridge). Each of the straits is close to 18 km in width. The missing links present different barriers. Storebelt is a time and price barrier of a magnitude which could be compared to a road distance of about 120 km. The two


others presents the same time and price barriers but also function as national borders, marking linguistic, cultural and economic differences. In addition, the Sound is (1994) an EU-border. It also represents an efficient hindrance to the integration of the Danish capital (Copenhagen, 1.6 million inhabitants) and the Malmö-Lund agglomeration (0.5 million inhabitants) on the Swedish side of the Sound. Building this bridge is a mega-event in itself but using the event as a tool in strategic planning is a challenge.

On the European ranking lists Copenhagen is ranked no. 32 in size of agglomeration population, and the city is no. 16 when size is measured as a gross agglomeration product. When the measure is creativity (knowledge, culture, and communication: innovations) Copenhagen ranks no. 12 in Europe and no. 6 concerning international air-passenger traffic. By adding figures from the Swedish side of the Sound to the Copenhagen figures, the rank shifts. Altogether, the towns within a radius of 50 kilometres from Copenhagen Airport are one of the five largest agglomerations of Europe as regards creativity. This Danish-Swedish agglomeration also represents one of the largest population concentrations in Northern Europe, no. 20 on the European list. To find larger neighbours you have to go to Rhein-Ruhr, Berlin, Warsaw, or St. Petersburg. In addition, Copenhagen, Malmö, and Lund are high-income cities compared with the European average. The new rank measured as gross agglomeration product is 8. When international passengers departing from the airport of Malmö are added to Copenhagen figures, the total increases, but not enough to change the rank. Adding figures do not create any new role for the South Scandinavian urban region. But it illustrates potentials. Critical masses are overcome without much investments apart from the bridge. New advantages of agglomeration is gained without any new disadvantages.

To the changes of ranks will come the changing potential of growth. In 1994, Copenhagen is the centre of Denmark (5 million inhabitants). At the turn of the century, the new Danish-Swedish agglomeration could be the centre of the whole South-Scandinavian region (8-9 mio. inh.). The consequence will be a large-scale change of dominance and hinterland on the Copenhagen-Stockholm level, for example when it comes to the use of international airports.

A fusion of Greater Copenhagen and the Malmö-Lund agglomeration gives the two hitherto non-interdependent urban economies access to more specialization and opens up for co-operation not thought of yet. Synergy will be an obvious consequence. To this change in growth potentials effects of new optimism and of rise in world interest due to the event itself will be added. Large-scale engineering and construction are of international interest, and a fusion of two agglomerations, which co-operate very little at present, is a world-class event. In many respects Copenhagen together with the South Scandinavian centres are expected to increase economic growth when the missing transportation links between Scandinavia and the European continent are substituted by fixed links and regional organization is integrated. The arguments are illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2 Sealand and Scania 1994 and 2004. Urban system. Distance measured as time



The South Scandinavian scene represents an area outside the European centre where development towards a cross-border regions is obvious. These trends comprehend a capital which is also among the 25 metropolitan units of the continent. It is in many respects an interesting laboratory of integration and of changes of the major units in the urban system. What can be foreseen is a growth in competitive vitality and a change in hinterland, not a parallel to the development of a network of the kind present in the European centre.

### Summary of conclusions

The transformation of structural conditions, internationalization, technological development, European integration and the reemergence of Eastern Europe on the scene of the international economy, open for a new phase of competition at the upper levels of the urban system of Europe. The transformations form a turbulent

Figure 3 The North European urban scene 1991. Distance measured as time (surface)





Figure 4 The North European urban scene 2006. Distance measured as time (surface)



phase which allows for sudden and surprising up- and down turns among the metropolis. The turbulence has increased demand for leadership and strategic planning. Ability to develop long-lasting alliances within the metropolis itself, between the metropolis and its hinterland, and on the international level has become most important. Two metropolis within the Baltic Sea region seem to have chances to improve their position markedly in the near future; Berlin by becoming German capital and Copenhagen in case of a successful integration with the large agglomeration on the Swedish side of the Sound following establishment of a fixed link. But these 'lucky incidents' do not guarantee success, they only provide some opportunities. It is up to local governments to exploit these chances. In the case of Copenhagen, the contours of a formulated strategy can be seen. A strategy that contains the 'usual elements', but in particular attempts to exploit the specific possibilities of Copenhagen. The lessons learned from the strategic mobilization of Glasgow made leaders of Copenhagen focus on growth potentials from culture and related industries. The policy of improving the urban cultural product would have a series of side effects on regional cooperation, local identity and urban marketing. Although being a temporary event, Cultural City '96 will be used to give the capital region a permanent lift. The bridge between Copenhagen and Malmö gives the region a chance for substantial improvement of position on the European scene. The infrastructure in itself is only the means, not the purpose. The potential changes in roles on the North European urban scene are illustrated in Figure 3 and 4. However many problems still represent barriers to successful strategic planning, especially a low degree of regional identity and the lack of regional government.

---

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ANDERSEN, H.T. & JØRGENSEN, J. 1994. "Urban Competition and Regeneration Strategies - Examined Inside Out", in Ministry of the Environment Spatial Development in Europe. Research Colloquium, march 1994. Copenhagen.
- ANDERSSON, Å.E. & MATTHIENSEN C.W. 1993. Øresundsregionen. Kreativitet, Integration, Vækst. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
- ANDERSSON, Å.E. & STRÖMQUIST U. 1989. The Emerging C-society.
- BERG, L.v.d., KLAASSEN L.H. & Meer J.v.d. 1990. Marketing Metropolitan Regions. Rotterdam.
- BOYLE, M. & HUGHES, G. 1991. "The Politics of the Representation of 'the Real': Discourses from the Left on Glasgow's Role as European City of Culture, 1990", Area, 23, 3: 217-228.
- CAPELLO, R. & P. NIJKAMP 1991. "Telecommunications as a Catalyst Development Strategy". conference paper, Vienna.
- CORTIE, C. 1993. European Capital Cities, a League of Their Own? Amsterdam: CGO Publications.
- DAMER, S. 1990. Glasgow, European City of Culture. Images and Realities. Centre for Metropolitan Research, University of Amsterdam.
- Kulturbyssekretariatet 1993. Kulturbu '96- Handlingsplan. København.
- RECLUS (Groupement d'Intérêt Public RECLUS) 1989. Les villes "Européennes". Montpellier.
- PALOMÄKI, M. 1991. "On the Possible Future West European Capital", GeoJournal, 24,3.
- WUSTEN, H.v.d. 1993. Capital Cities in Europe. Introduction, Amsterdam: CGO Publications.