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VI. Re-Cycling Urban Landscape

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L.S. Bourne
The Role of Gentrification in the Changing Ecology of Income:
Evidence from Canadian Cities and Implication for Further Research

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

THE ROLE OF GENTRIFICATION IN THE CHANGING ECOLOGY OF INCOME: EVIDENCE FROM CANADIAN CITIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

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Frequent assertions are made to the effect that gentrification has dramatically transformed the social structure of inner cities in western countries. This paper argues that these assertions are exaggerations. Gentrification, at least in North America, has affected relatively few cities and even in those favoured cities has not been the most significant process of social change. Empirical evidence in support of these assertions is drawn from on-going research on the changing ecology of income and social status in Canadian cities. Gentrification as a process, and gentrified neighbourhoods as outcomes of that process, are shown to be rather localized and relatively marginal architects of social change. The paper concludes by identifying some of the lessons for further research that might be learned from these results.

The contemporary literature on gentrification is voluminous and growing rapidly (SMITH and WILLIAMS 1986; VAN WEESEP 1994; BEAUREGARD 1994). That literature, although often providing useful case studies of local area change, frequently contains generalizations that go far beyond the limits of the research design and the empirical evidence available. As illustrations, the process of gentrification - defined as involving the movement of middle-class households into older inner city neighbourhoods formerly occupied by households of lower income and social status - is said by some observers to have dramatically transformed the inner city, leading to a reorganization of urban social space and an "embourgeoisement" of the living environments that cities provide. To some authors gentrification is seen as the most significant process reshaping the social structure and quality of life in contemporary western cities.

This paper argues that these kinds of assertions are unwarranted exaggerations. My starting premise is that gentrification, at least in North America, has to date affected relatively few cities and even in those cities it is not the most significant process of social or neighbourhood transition. The contention here is that such assertions are inappropriate in part because the scale and impacts of gentrification have not been systematically evaluated in relation to other forms of urban social change. In this paper evidence in support of these criticisms is provided through an empirical evaluation of the relative contribution of gentrification to the changing ecology of income and neighbourhood change in Canadian cities in general, but with particular emphasis on recent trends in the Toronto metropolitan area.

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Setting the Stage: Gentrification in Context

A critique of gentrification would logically begin with a systematic deconstruction of both its cultural origins and underlying conceptualizations. However, since the following argument rests primarily on assessing the relative importance of the process within an empirical framework, a detailed discussion of alternative concepts and theories is not necessary. These issues are carefully reviewed elsewhere (HAMNETT 1991; VAN WEESEP 1994; BEAUREGARD 1994; LEY 1994). Nevertheless, a few poignant comments are appropriate to set the stage and to put gentrification "in its place".

There is little doubt that part of the current debate on the meaning and significance of gentrification is basically a matter of semantics. Most of us would agree that there is no agreed-upon definition of what gentrification is or how it should be measured. For many students of the inner city the restrictive definition given above - that is, gentrification as a process in which members of one social class (the middle-class) invade and subsequently dominate residential areas occupied by those of lower status (usually the working class) - is the point of departure. Unfortunately, there are relatively few situations where this specific form of social transition has actually taken place. As a result, the tendency has been to extend the gentrification envelope to encompass a variety of processes that may also lead to social upgrading in older inner city areas, processes which some of us would argue do not constitute gentrification in any sense of the term. These differences in application would not be especially significant were it not that the terminology is itself loaded with excessive cultural and political baggage. It is this combination of loose definitions and excess theoretical baggage that leads to unwarranted generalizations and unrealistic assessments of the role of gentrification in the inner city.

As an additional source of confusion, gentrification is frequently equated with the process of urban revitalization, in all of its varied forms (BOURNE 1993a; BADCOCK 1992 and 1993; BEAUREGARD 1994). This in turn leads to the inclusion, as part of the gentrification process, of the upgrading of older commercial districts, the reuse and redevelopment of derelict industrial and waterfront areas, in-fill housing and condominium construction, as well as improvements to public facilities and civic institutions. Invariably, this inclusive application conceals the distinctive and restrictive origins of gentrification, and clearly results in an exaggeration of its scale and impacts.

Nevertheless, any attempt to assess the relative importance of gentrification requires that we specify not only a concrete definition but an explicit set of measurement criteria. For present purposes, I have chosen to apply the restrictive (and stereo-typical definition), which refers to a change in the social composition of urban neighbourhoods, whereby households of one status level or class, typically professionals, replace those of a lower status, typically described as working class. For some the concept of class is central to the identification and explanation of the process, but it too is an exceptionally porous concept. In practice, class is seldom

L.S. Bourne
The Role of Gentrification in the Changing Ecology of Income:
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Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
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explicitly defined; it is simply assumed or imposed on an unsuspecting population. Varying the criteria of measurement, of course, alters the results and the images those results invoke.

My third point is that gentrification, however defined, can only be assessed in context. By this I initially mean understanding the geographical setting - the locality - in which the process occurs; an argument that LEES (1994) has recently re-iterated with respect to London and New York. But I also mean setting the relative contributions of gentrification within any urban area against those of other processes leading to social and residential change in the city. The processes of interest here include the effects of dramatic post-war demographic transitions (e.g. baby and marriage booms and busts, fertility declines); the social origins of fluctuations in household formation rates and revised choices in living arrangements; the condominium (and tenure) transformation; continued employment and occupational restructuring; revisions in the linkages between the local economy and households and individuals, as suppliers of labour; changing attitudes to family, community and collective social responsibility; the localized and uneven impacts of crime, poverty, racism and social alienation; the impacts of increasingly diverse flows of immigrants and refugees; the revealed preferences and heightened aspirations of ethno-cultural groups for social space, political recognition and a larger piece of the economic pie; reorganizations of the social welfare net and systems of social service provision; and the constraints and incentives provided by planning authorities and other public agencies; to name but a few. The gentrification concept, it is argued here, captures relatively few of these processes.

The traditional concept of gentrification can also be criticized here precisely because it gives undue prominence to one form of neighbourhood change, resulting from a specific combination of events, over all others. We could ask, for instance, why the movement of a neighbourhood across an arbitrary class or status boundary qualifies that particular neighbourhood for privileged attention? Neighbourhoods, as we know, are always changing; none are completely stable. Some are invariably moving up the ladder of social status, others are moving down. Indeed, some may shift markedly on the same scale but without crossing a class or status boundary, as is often the case of elite districts. Are these any less significant? The same neighbourhoods, as analyses of long-term trajectories have demonstrated, may shift upward or downward at different points in time (BEAUREGARD 1990). Most empirical research on gentrification has also been rather selective, if not myopic. Studies have tended to focus on those few neighbourhoods where social status and housing investment have shifted dramatically upward. However, such neighbourhoods, although highly visible and vocal, are relatively rare.

The literature in this field can also be criticized with respect to assertions that the process is relatively recent. In some settings it may indeed be recent, in others it is clearly not. The earliest reference that I have found in post-war Canada to the phenomenon of middle-income households moving back into older neighbourhoods in the central city is in the report of a Royal Commission published in 1957, and

L.S. Bourne
The Role of Gentrification in the Changing Ecology of Income:
Evidence from Canadian Cities and Implication for Further Research

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

drawing on data from the 1951 Census. Archival research in Toronto has also shown that renovation activity was well underway much earlier in the inner city, during the late 1920s and 1930s (LEMON 1985). Much of this investment appears to have made use of public funds, or at least public leverage, but the result was the same - a substantial change in the social attributes of the neighbourhood.

A considerable body of scholarly opinion has now accumulated to the effect that gentrification has been much less prominent as a path of neighbourhood change in the US than it first appeared to be. William FREY (1990), for example, ended his assessment of recent demographic changes and urban population movements within US cities by noting that while pockets of gentrification do exist within some large central cities, and these are more likely to be found in cosmopolitan cities such as San Francisco and Washington DC, it appears that:

"...the baby boom generation has followed the patterns of earlier generations by moving to the suburbs as they begin to raise their families" (p.37).

With respect to the long-term impacts of gentrification, he concludes:

"The hope that affluent baby boomers would re-invigorate the nation's largest central cities has evaporated" (p. 38).

Before turning to the empirical analysis, I should clarify what it is that I am not saying. I am not arguing that gentrification is irrelevant to the state of the nation's cities, as some might argue. Nor am I saying that it has not had significant impacts in certain districts in selected cities. Nor does my position imply that gentrification is not a prominent force elsewhere, perhaps in western and central Europe (VAN WEESEP and MUSTERD 1991; BRUN and FAGNANI 1994), although there too the danger of over-generalization is clearly present.

Assessing the Contribution of Gentrification: A Canadian Case Study

How does one assess the relative contribution of gentrification to neighbourhood change and social upgrading in the inner city? The particular empirical evidence on which much of my argument rests is drawn from an on-going study on the redistribution of income, wealth, capital investment and collective consumption within Canadian metropolitan areas. Although still incomplete, this study explores the dimensions, causes and implications of the changing geography of capital, income and wealth, and social inequality both between and within inner cities and suburbs. The objective, ultimately, is to contribute to extending a conceptual framework and an empirical base for understanding how and why capital and income move over space, among households and social groups, and into and out of the built environment, and with what effects (HARVEY 1985; BADCOCK 1992; SMITH 1994).

The metric used to evaluate the contribution of gentrification is personal (household and family) income. We have chosen to use this variable in this paper, rather than a more complex multi-dimensional criterion, for three reasons; because of its simplicity in interpretation, because it is the most consistent over the long time period under

L.S. Bourne
The Role of Gentrification in the Changing Ecology of Income:
Evidence from Canadian Cities and Implication for Further Research

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

analysis, and because it captures the interaction effects of changes in other dimensions of contemporary social life (e.g. in demography, living arrangement, occupation and labour market participation) better than any other index. It is not, however, without serious limitations.

The income variable (discounted for inflation) encompasses wages and salaries, interest and investment income, as well as all transfers to individuals through government programs (e.g. social assistance) and collective consumption. At a later stage, the income derived in kind from the consumption of public goods and services will be imputed from local tax and assessment rates and from local variations in levels of service provision. The brief discussion to follow, however, focuses only on changes in the redistribution of income, by subarea and source.

These data are then used to examine the simple question posed at the outset: how important has the gentrification process been in contributing to the changing ecology of income within Canadian metropolitan areas? The present analysis builds on the results reported in several earlier papers (BOURNE 1993a, 1993b, 1994), by extending the data to include the results of the 1991 Census and by varying the spatial units of analysis to include a wider range of neighbourhood types. The examples below will cover only one metropolitan area, the Toronto census metropolitan area (CMA), for the period 1951-1991, but with particular emphasis on the most recent 1986-1991 census period[1].

To set an appropriate context for the empirical test to follow we should provide a brief overview of recent trends in the distribution of income for the entire Toronto metropolitan area and specifically for the central city and inner city area. Table 1 provides a summary of trends in the spatial distribution of household income, measured as an index and by municipality within the CMA from 1950 to 1990. The data reveal the classical ecological pattern: the central city and inner area municipalities are on average poorer than the suburbs, and have become poorer over time. Thus, in a metropolitan area that has frequently been cited as having witnessed widespread gentrification over the last few decades (SABOURIN 1994; LEY 1994), the inner area-suburban contrast in incomes has intensified.

Nevertheless, the effects of urban revitalization and social upgrading are still evident. The income (and thus social status) index for the central city as a whole, that had declined steadily from at least the 1950s, has increased moderately since 1980, from 89.0 to 91.3. At the same time, the relative social status of the older inner suburbs and even the mature (post-war) suburbs, has declined very sharply. The suburb of Scarborough, for example, had above average household income (103.2) as a new suburb in the 1950s, but by 1990 had income levels well below the metropolitan average (89.8) and below that of the central city. Poverty, and low incomes, are becoming common attributes of the older suburbs, in part because of the suburbanization of social housing construction and the in-flows of new immigrants.

These aggregations, however, obscure considerable variability within each municipality and district, especially the central city. Table 2 illustrates the contrasts in income within and between the central downtown core, the inner city and the central

L.S. Bourne
The Role of Gentrification in the Changing Ecology of Income:
Evidence from Canadian Cities and Implication for Further Research

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

Table 1   Trends in the Spatial Distribution of Average Household Income, by Municipality, Toronto CMA, 1950-90 CMA=100

	1950(a)	1970	1980	1985	1990
INNER AREA					
City of Toronto	93.1	90.8	89.0	90.9	91.3
East York	107.4	89.2	85.3	80.9	80.8
York	102.5	84.6	78.4	75.3	75.8
MATURE SUBURBS					
Scarborough	103.2	99.7	97.7	95.3	89.8
North York	116.6	110.7	103.4	100.1	98.4
Etobicoke	116.8	109.0	105.5	102.4	96.8
NEWER SUBURBS					
Mississauga	n.a.	110.8	110.2	108.8	106.0
Brampton	n.a.	103.8	106.3	105.4	105.5
Richmond Hill	n.a.	98.2	107.7	116.2	120.0
Oakville	n.a.	112.2	121.4	123.7	130.0
Vaughan	n.a.	116.7	132.4	128.1	132.9
Markham	n.a.	123.6	136.4	139.7	137.1

n.a. = not available

CMA = Census Metropolitan Area = 100

(a) = Municipalities aggregated to conform to present boundaries

Sources: Census of Canada, various years, 1951 through 1991

city, relative to the CMA. Note first that all of these zones have seen upgrading relative to the CMA, and that the downtown core now has higher average incomes than the CMA as a whole. This clearly is the combined result of revitalization and new condominium construction on commercial and industrial lands, and gentrification. Second, the skewness index (the standardized difference between average and median incomes), has increased for all areas, but notably for the downtown core and the inner city. In this sense income and status polarization has deepened over the study period, in part we might assume as a result of both revitalization and gentrification.

What specific contribution did gentrification and gentrified neighbourhoods in particular make to this process of social upgrading? As a first step in responding to

L.S. Bourne	Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
The Role of Gentrification in the Changing Ecology of Income:	Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Evidence from Canadian Cities and Implication for Further Research	Band 52, Berlin 1994

Table 2   Changing Income Distributions and Levels of Polarization, Downtown Core, Inner City and Central City, Toronto, 1970-90

Median Household Income by Area	1970 (a)	1990 (b)	Change 1970-90
As Ratio of CMA (1)			(b) - (a)
Central Core (2)	81.3	103.2	+21.9
Inner City	68.7	74.5	+5.8
Central City	90.8	91.3	+0.5
CMA	100.0	100.0	-
Skewness Index (3)			(b) - (a) / (a)
Central Core	31.3	41.1	+37.7
Inner City	24.8	40.2	+62.1
Central City	22.8	33.8	+48.2
CMA (rest)	11.9	16.8	+41.1
Coefficient of Variation (%)			(b) - (a)
Central Core	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Inner City	37	69	+32
Central City	47	61	+14
CMA (rest)	36	43	+7

(1) CMA = Census Metropolitan Area

(2) Core = CBD, the central business district and its immediate surroundings of mixed commercial and industrial uses

(3) Skewness Index (S). S = average-median income x 100/median

n.a. = not available

Sources: Census of Canada, various years

this question thirty-five neighbourhoods were identified within the central city as having undergone some form of social upgrading. Otherwise stable neighbourhoods (those whose relative income and status ranking changed by less than 5%), and those of declining income, were not included, although they remain a primary focus of the larger project.

These thirty-five neighbourhoods were in turn classified into five distinct types based on both the social and physical forms of upgrading underway. These areas

L.S. Bourne
The Role of Gentrification in the Changing Ecology of Income:
Evidence from Canadian Cities and Implication for Further Research

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

included:

1) newer redevelopment districts (6); 2) long-established elite areas (6); 3) middle-income districts (9); 4) immigrant-ethnic communities (8); and 5) gentrified neighbourhoods (6). The latter neighbourhoods were identified from previous research on gentrification in the city (e.g. LEY 1992; BOURNE 1993b; SABOURIN 1994); the four earlier types were defined by the usual socio-economic and ethnic origin variables. The respective contributions of each neighbourhood type to overall income growth were then calculated as simple summations (weighted) of income growth in that area as percentages of city-wide growth. The results, for the household income variable alone, and in terms of the relative ranking of neighbourhood types, are summarized here as Table 3.

Table 3   The Contribution of Different Types and Processes of Neighbourhood Transition to Aggregate Income Growth in the Central City, Toronto, 1950-90

Rank in Income 1991	Neighbourhood Type and Inputed Transition Process	No. of Areas	Range of Income* (C000$)	Rank in Aggregate Contribution
1.	Existing elite areas	6	125-235	2
2.	Redeveloped - new social spaces	4	75-155	1
3.	Upgrading of middle-income neighbourhoods	9	65-125	3
4.	Gentrified neighbourhoods	6	55-105	5
5.	Upgrading of immigrant-ethnic neighbourhoods	8	40-75	4

* Incomes are averages for all households (in 1990 current dollars).

Source: Calculations based on Statistics Canada data, Census of Canada, 1991; adapted and extended from BOURNE (1993a and 1994)

The obvious conclusion from this simple test is that gentrified neighbourhoods, as aggregate social entities, and measured in terms of the total income growth received by resident households in those areas, ranked fifth and last among the neighbourhood types. The largest contributor to aggregate income growth and redistribution in the inner city resulted from the redevelopment of formerly underused or vacant industrial, railway and port lands for residential purposes, typically as condominiums. Almost without exception, these areas contained little or no prior residential population. The second and third ranked contributions to overall social upgrading in the central city were the continued accumulation of wealth in older elite

L.S. Bourne
The Role of Gentrification in the Changing Ecology of Income:
Evidence from Canadian Cities and Implication for Further Research

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

residential areas, and the more modest but still significant upgrading of existing middle-income areas of the city. The fourth-ranked contributor, rather surprisingly, was the relative growth in income in many of the city's older (primarily second and third generation) and lower-income immigrant and ethnic neighbourhoods.

It seems reasonable to conclude that when set in context, gentrified neighbourhoods in themselves did not represent a large proportion of total aggregate income growth in the central city. When measured by the capital investment included in residential renovation and house purchase, although these data are far less reliable due to enumeration errors and spill-over effects (and thus are not reported here), the proportional contribution of gentrification was even lower.

How would these results differ among individual neighbourhoods? Among the 12 highest income neighbourhoods in the central city in the 1991 Census (those with average household incomes of over C$100,000), only one was a gentrified neighbourhood as defined above. That neighbourhood, Don Vale, ranked eleventh overall. Most of the other neighbourhoods typically classified as gentrified had household incomes around the metropolitan average, and most witnessed slower rates of income growth over the latter part of the study period than either elite or middle-income areas.

The range and diversity of neighbourhood income levels and rates of social upgrading are illustrated in Table 4 for a sample of each of the neighbourhood types. Note that the income levels (in 1990) varied widely, from C$59,500 to over C$231,000, or from 100.2 to 329.6 as ratios of the metropolitan average. Over the period in question some of these neighbourhoods more than doubled their wealth level relative to the entire metropolitan area. Clearly, even among upgrading areas, social polarization is immense and increasing. Only one of the gentrified neighbourhoods, again Don Vale, became wealthier over the study period at a rate (105% increase) common among the elite and middle-income areas. The proposition that gentrification is not a recent phenomenon is confirmed through an analysis of the time series data. The peak of the gentrification process in most of the gentrified neighbourhoods defined, at least in terms of income growth (and associated) house price inflation, was in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Among these neighbourhoods, only Don Vale continued to attract middle-income households at the same rate during the house-price boom of the mid-1980s. Even then it was swamped by social changes taking place elsewhere in the city, and through other kinds of processes. Thus, even in a city where gentrification is widely regarded to have been substantial, and where incomes in the downtown core area now exceed the metropolitan average, and those in the central city have risen relative to the metropolitan area as a whole, gentrification was not the dominant architect of social upgrading nor of the spatial redistribution of income. Assuming that the above neighbourhood typology can be equated with the spatial outcomes of different processes of social change - and that is a critical assumption - there are several other processes and outcomes leading to upgrading and revitalization that warrant higher priority in our research agenda[2].

L.S. Bourne
The Role of Gentrification in the Changing Ecology of Income:
Evidence from Canadian Cities and Implication for Further Research

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

Table 4   Rates of Income Growth and Social Upgrading Among Elite, Redeveloped,
Gentrified and Immigrant Neighbourhoods, Inner Area, Toronto, 1950-90

Selected Inner Area Neighbourhoods (and CT)	Household Income 1990 (a) (in 000s$)	1950 Index (b) CMA=100	1990 Index (b) CMA=100	Index Change 1950-90 (in %)
Old Elite areas:				
Rosedale (86)	196.1	160.2	329.6	105.7
Rosedale (87)	129.9	127.1	218.7	72.1
Forest Hill(130)	172.1	158.8	289.7	85.9
Forest Hill(131)	123.9	157.1	208.5	32.7
Newly Redeveloped:				
Waterfront (13)	113.1	-	190.4	-
Inner Suburban:				
Bayview (264)	231.1	226.2	389.1	72.0
Don Valley (266)	180.7	186.3	304.2	63.3
Gentrified:				
Don Vale (67)	102.4	89.0	172.4	93.7
Don Vale (68)	61.6	90.0	103.7	15.2
Riverdale (69)	59.9	76.2	103.7	30.2
Immigrant:				
Dundas W. (41-45)	59.5	64.1	100.2	56.3
CENTRAL CITY	54.3	94.5	91.3	-3.5
METRO AREA (CMA)	59.5	100.0	100.0	-

(a) = average household income in thousands of current dollars.

(b) = ratio of neighbourhood income to CMA (Census Metropolitan Area) average.

Sources: Census of Canada, various years, 1951 through 1991

Among these priorities are the impacts of expanding immigrant populations, residential redevelopment and condominium conversion, and the widespread intensification of older elite and middle-income neighbourhoods.

L.S. Bourne
The Role of Gentrification in the Changing Ecology of Income:
Evidence from Canadian Cities and Implication for Further Research

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

Counter-arguments Addressed

How might the proponents of gentrification respond to these criticisms and analytical results? Some observers will argue that all of the above processes of social change and upgrading represent gentrification, but in different forms and locations. To accept this definitional argument implies that the term has unlimited flexibility, and therefore, in my view, little meaning and even less analytical utility. If gentrification is supposed to have something to do with the replacement (or displacement) of residents of one (low) class by those of higher income and status, in particular places and neighbourhood settings, then it cannot in my view encompass developments in areas that were not previously residential.

Others may argue that this analysis is not a real test of the significance of the gentrification process, because of the restrictive definition and classification used, or because of the selection of variables. Specifically, some will reply that this approach ignores other and sometimes more subtle changes that may be unrelated to income and that are more appropriate to evaluating the social imprint of the process itself. Among the most obvious of such variables are educational level and occupational status (LEY 1992). There is, for example, little doubt that indices based on educational attainment and occupation status (e.g. professionals) show higher levels in most Canadian inner cities than do indices for income alone. For example, in the Toronto case the 1991 Census shows that average incomes in the central city are only 91.3 percent of those in the CMA (median incomes are only 81.4 percent) and the poverty level is much higher (19.2% to 12.4%). Yet the proportion of the population with university degrees is substantially higher in the central city (21.7% compared to 13.3% in the CMA), as is the proportion working in personal and business services, government, health and education (32.4% to 27.7%).

How does one account for this apparent paradox? The most obvious explanation is that they represent different populations. The City's population has become increasingly polarized, between an educated, professional and higher-income population and a poorly educated, manual and lower-income cohort. The higher proportion of university-educated in the central area also reflects the uneven distribution of institutions of advanced learning, hospitals and government offices, most of which are located in the central core. Yet, a much higher proportion of the university-educated population in the city is in the younger age cohorts (under 34), many presumably are students or recent graduates. Finally, the overwhelmingly majority of university graduates live in established middle-income and elite areas, not in gentrified neighbourhoods.

Others will argue that the above analysis primarily measures the physical extent of gentrification, and that this is not the real issue. Instead, it has been suggested, gentrification should be considered as a "metaphor for restructuring" that goes well beyond the spatial imprint of gentrification itself. As MARCUSE (1986) argues, it is possible and indeed likely that gentrification may not lead to an increase in the average income (or rent-paying ability) of the entire central city, but rather involves a

L.S. Bourne
The Role of Gentrification in the Changing Ecology of Income:
Evidence from Canadian Cities and Implication for Further Research

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

redistribution of wealth and of middle-class households within the city, even within a declining city. I agree; and this is precisely why the neighbourhood-level analysis above was undertaken. The empirical results indicate that while income redistribution has occurred it has taken place to a much greater extent in neighbourhoods and districts other than those classified as gentrified.

Although the indices of change used above are admittedly blunt, they still capture a significant proportion of social upgrading within the city of Toronto. Even if one were to accept that gentrified neighbourhoods are unique, in terms of the attributes of the residents, the housing stock or the nature of the residential conversion process involved, the fact that they are overwhelmed by other changes in the social fabric, and in property re-investment and income redistribution, undermines the widespread attention they have received in the contemporary literature.

Lessons Learned: Implications for Research

What implications, if any, can be drawn from this analysis regarding research and public policy? Are the conclusions with respect to the impacts of gentrification likely to hold true in the future? In concluding the paper we attempt to draw out some of the lessons learned and to suggest future research needs.

The arguments presented here point first to the dangers inherent in research which focuses on only the most visible - but not the most significant - process of social and neighbourhood change, and that does so in isolation. The second lesson is to stress the need to set gentrification in context, that is to put it "in its place" with regards to locally-specific conditions and determinants of change. Third, there is an obvious requirement to evaluate the role and impacts of gentrification in direct relation to the contributions of other processes of social and residential transition operating in our cities, including all forms and expressions of neighbourhood change and urban revitalization. Fourth, the importance of local context, and the variability of the gentrification process from city-to-city, suggest that the search for an all-encompassing explanation is inappropriate.

Finally, there is now a growing awareness that many of the socio-demographic, economic and political conditions which initially encouraged the gentrification process in the 1960s and 1970s are unlikely to continue in the 1990s. Instead, the central areas of most North American cities, including Toronto, began the decade with an immense over-supply of offices, declining real estate prices, stagnant employment, declining public services, and an aging population. Indeed, it has been argued elsewhere that we may be entering a post-gentrification era (BOURNE 1993a). This era will likely witness - at least in most inner cities of North America - far less employment growth, reduced capital investment in the built-environment, fewer new households, a shrinkage of the middle-income cohort, reduced public sector employment and downsized institutions.

To summarize, the argument here is that the spatial and social imprint of

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Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
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gentrification, as a process of neighbourhood change, has been systematically exaggerated. It is simply not that important in most cities, and is essentially irrelevant in most others. It has not transformed our cities, nor re-written our agenda for theoretical or applied research. In most Canadian and American cities, poverty remains the most serious and persistent policy problem (GOLDSMITH and BLAKELY 1992; BOURNE 1993b). Further, and by implication, our undue emphasis on gentrification as a priority for research represents a misallocation of scarce human resources, diverting those resources from the study of more significant processes and policy issues (HAMNETT 1991; SPAIN 1992; BADCOCK 1993; BEAUREGARD 1994).

The challenge we face is that of re-conceptualizing the social and residential dynamics of contemporary cities under the very different conditions prevailing in the 1990s. Specifically, we need to allocate more of our collective resources and talents to documenting the immense array of processes underlying urban social change, and to an understanding of the diverse paths and uneven impacts of current social transitions and conflicts in social space and living conditions. This is particularly evident in the increasingly sharp contrasts between elite districts on the one hand and the truly marginalized and impoverished neighbourhoods on the other hand. As gentrification becomes increasingly marginal, the opportunity exists to redirect our interests and energies to solving the real problems of cities.

NOTES

1. Income reported in the Census is for the calendar year preceding the census. Thus, the 1991 Census reported income for 1990.
2. The other dimension of these changes is the increasing polarization of income within the central city between the wealthy and middle class areas and those in the poorer districts, as well as among households within each district. A simple measure of income inequality for the City of Toronto (measured as the standardized differential between average and median household incomes) rose from 26.1 in 1981 to 38.8 in 1991; compared to a metropolitan-wide average of 18.8 in 1991.

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GENTRIFICATION AND THE YOUTH MOVEMENTS OF THE 1960S

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The 1960s student movement reached its symbolic climax in spring 1968 in Paris. Although the beginnings of gentrification as a discernible urban process in the late 1960s coincided with these events, the adversarial youth culture has been given surprisingly little attention in the historical contextualisation of the process.

This paper summarises a longer argument that locates the beginnings of gentrification in the critique of everyday life that was implicit in the late 1960s 'youth ghettoes' of major cities. Two aspects of that critique are particularly relevant for gentrification. First the spatialisation of the critique contrasted the one-dimensional conformity of the suburbs with the adversarial spontaneity of old inner city areas, valued precisely because they were devalued by mainstream society. Second, the aestheticism of the critique as a cultural politics, with a lifestyle exalting the prophetic status of the artist, aided the widespread aestheticisation that has accompanied later stages of gentrification.

The paper reconsiders Stuart HALL's neglected claim in 1969 that the hippies, the most conspicuous element of youth culture, were "some of the first enlisted troops in a new kind of politics of post-modern post-industrial society: the politics of cultural rebellion". Or in the later words of a Vancouver realtor, gentrification is a matter of "following the hippies". While not neglecting alternative explanations, the posing of a cultural politics, and indeed a cultural geography, that follows the youth movement is an insight worth pressing further.

Key Words: Cultural Politics, Gentrification, Student Movement

For some years I have been examining the restructuring of labour markets and housing markets in the downtowns and inner cities of six large metropolitan areas in Canada: Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Ottawa, and Edmonton, the five largest metropolitan areas, and Halifax, the major city in Atlantic Canada (LEY 1988, 1992, 1995). A principal feature of this restructuring has been the growth of managerial and professional workers, the so-called quaternary sector of the work force. Since 1971 more than half of net employment growth in these metropolitan areas has comprised quaternary level positions, a remarkable figure when it is recalled that these are jobs at the top of the employment hierarchy, enjoying the highest salary levels.

A minority of these workers have sought out a residence in the inner city, contributing to the phenomenon of gentrification. However, because of the simultaneous loss of non-quaternary employees from these same neighbourhoods, since 1981 quaternary workers have become *over*represented as inner city residents relative to metropolitan totals. In the six cities together they have increased from 18 percent of labour force members resident in the inner city in 1971 to 38 percent in 1991, for a net gain of 160,000 residents with professional and managerial jobs. The extent of this migration has contributed to a significant restructuring of many inner city neighbourhoods.

This paper considers only one aspect of this *embourgeoisement* of the inner city. What, if any, is the relationship between the gentrification of the inner city in the past

two decades and the youth movements that preceded it in the 1960s? For these youth subcultures were also significantly concentrated in the inner city. In the City of Toronto, for example, there was a net gain of 40,000 young adults aged 15-24 during the 1960s, while the inner districts subsequently gained 60,000 quaternary workers between 1971 and 1991. If most pronounced in the primate city, these trends were not limited to Toronto. In Vancouver, 60 percent of net migrants to the City between 1966 and 1971 were in the 20-24 age cohort, and here the research question may be asked more pointedly. The Kitsilano neighbourhood gained several thousand young adults in the 1960s and became the city's principal concentration of the counterculture. But within a few years significant change was underway, and between 1971 and 1976 some 40 three storey condominium buildings had been constructed in the district, and it had achieved the reputation of the city's most celebrated gentrified district.

What is the relationship between the presence of youth subcultures in the 1960s and subsequent gentrification of inner city districts? Three possibilities present themselves. The first is that any association is coincidental, a random conjunction warranting no further attention. A second possibility is a functional one, that the youth were the last group of poor residents to generate an economic return for owners from deteriorating housing near the end of its history of down filtering, housing that was occupied primarily because of its low cost. The third possibility is the most interesting theoretically. Besides its functional value, these old inner city neighbourhoods held a symbolic value for their residents. For the youth subcultures inner city living meant not only affordability, but was also in significant ways a statement of a cultural and political identity oppositional to mainstream culture. Place, or geography, became an important component in the constitution of an alternative identity politics. In this third interpretation, which will now be explored in more detail, the youth cultures transformed the meaning of space, and as this new topography of meaning was passed on to receptive fragments of the middle class, so gentrification emerged as a strategy to enlarge a particular expression of cultural and political identity.

The Aestheticisation of the Contemporary City

Gentrification is part of a larger constellation of phenomena, what some authors refer to as the aestheticisation of the contemporary city. This term invokes the rise of the 'soft city', with a new found importance for the arts, heritage preservation, leisure and tourism, a premium upon fashion and design, lively public places, boutiquing, and greater prominence for major sporting events and the spectacle. In some versions these are the essential conditions of the postmodern city (HARVEY 1989).

Aestheticisation is not a new phenomenon of course. The aesthetic personality was a central element of nineteenth century Romanticism, and at mid-century KIERKEGAARD wrote with some passion on the relations between the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious personality. More recently, the authors of the Frankfurt

School described the rise of the culture industry that they claimed sought to remove ethical judgements from a population of consumers, and trained them to respond sensuously to commercial and state propaganda, abandoning the responsibilities of citizenship for the pleasures of consumption. The French activist Guy DEBORD (1973) referred to such a condition as the society of the spectacle, raising the spectre of a brain-dead population, passive before the seductive delights of consumption.

It does seem as if there has been a quickening in the pace of aestheticiation in major city centres in recent decades. Cities like Toronto and Vancouver have made large investments in the arts, leisure, sports and tourism, while Montreal completed 14 substantial leisure projects in 1992 at a cost of $310 million. Three-quarters of attractions listed in the *Montreal Tourist Guide* are located in or near the downtown area (BROADWAY 1993). In this paper I will suggest in a preliminary manner that it may well be worth looking more closely at the youth movements of the 1960s for one source of the aesthetic disposition. This is by no means the only origin, and one should not for a moment overlook the role of the market and the state in promoting landscapes of consumption. But as we shall see, the youth movements were a large enough social cohort that they were able to impact the city in important ways concerning the *meanings* of urban life as well as the *forms* of urban development.

The Counter*culture*

First, consider the youth movements as a counter*culture*, concerned with the recovery of authentic meaning in everyday life in a society dominated by systems and structures that were perceived to be oppressive: sclerotic and authoritarian educational structures, self-seeking private corporations, an impersonal and repressive state apparatus, and an aggressive military-industrial complex. Here were the alienations that Herbert MARCUSE, one of the prophetic voices of the 1960s, castigated for their role in shrinking civil society to a one-dimensional society (MARCUSE 1964).

Because these alienations moved beyond the workplace to invade the whole of everyday life, the old Marxist focus upon the relations of production was inadequate. Authors like MARCUSE, LEFEBVRE (1991), and DEBORD (1973) identified the insidious control of a corporate society in the relations of *re*production. Particularly in French social theory, an antidote to the passivity of consumption was identified in the spontaneity and reversals of festival, a place and time for establishing community and creative self-expression. Continuing in the avant-garde tradition of defamiliarisation, throwing into doubt the taken-for-granted, LEFEBVRE saw in the freedom of festival a liminal condition where the routines of everyday life could be suspended in an "explosion of forces" (LEFEBVRE 1991, p. 202), where "tout est permit" (POSTER 1975, p. 244). So it was that the French student movement in particular had a distinctively cultural and festive edge. A *cri de coeur* from the Sorbonne in June 1968 declared "the bourgeois revolution was judicial, the

proletarian revolution was economic. Ours will be social and cultural so that man can be himself" (YINGER 1982, p. 202). Or, in perhaps the best remembered Paris graffito of spring 1968, "Beneath the paving stones, the beach".

The pursuit of anti-structure, and the elevation of spontaneity and self-expression, had a strong Romantic character (TURKLE 1975; MARTIN 1981). Lord BYRON, the nineteenth century Romantic poet and warrior, had claimed that 'the great object of life is sensation', and critics of the student movement both on the right (BELL 1976), and the left (HABERMAS 1970), challenged what they saw as the sensuality of liberated youth. Moreover, personality assessments showed that sympathisers of the student movement scored highly on such personality dimensions as aestheticism, emotion and sensitivity (QUARTER 1972). The sensuality of 1960s youth had a further expression of the greatest importance that has not attracted the attention it deserves. The Romantic turn led to the ascension of art and artistic imagination, and the selective mobilisation of students in the arts and social sciences. A review of American and Canadian findings, reinforced with an empirical study at the University of Toronto, concluded that the most radical political sympathies were located in the arts, humanities and social sciences, and such related fields as social work and liberal theology, while conservative sentiments were held in engineering, law and business programs, with the natural sciences and other professional schools falling between (QUARTER 1972). Remarkably, we shall see later this disciplinary sequence reappearing in residential patterns in Canadian cities in the 1980s.

There is one further point to make as we consider the distinctively cultural complexion of the youth movement. The Romanticism of the movement and the aestheticism of its adherents, led naturally to the privileged status of the artist as a prophetic voice of social criticism in a secular society, usurping the traditional authority of religious leaders. The artist, moreover, besides a social role, served an exemplar of a liberated lifestyle. Freed from bourgeois disciplines, the artist was released to pursue the creation of new meanings and self-determination. The artistic way of life was totemic of an alternative society of anti-structure. In this light it is surely no accident that artists as an occupational group have experienced remarkable growth over the past 25 years. Their rate of increase exceeded overall job growth by 300 percent in Canada and the United States in the 1970s. Their avocation is symbolic and expressive, not functional and instrumental; a Toronto survey revealed that half the artists that were interviewed made a net *loss* in arts related activity (Social Data Research 1990). Clearly they were marching to a different drummer than that of the corporate organisation man.

The *Counter*culture

The youth movement was a culture of reversals, countering the presuppositions of bourgeois society. In its repertoire of anti-structure, the single theme that will be examined here is its reinterpretation of the meaning of urban space (see also

LEFEBVRE 1969). The artists are key players in this argument. HABERMAS has observed how "the avant garde must find a direction in a landscape into which no one yet seems to have ventured" (HABERMAS 1983). He was thinking, metaphorically, of pure aesthetics, but his insight has a greater range, extending to the literal astheticisation of space.

So what kinds of places are artists drawn to? First, and overwhelmingly, they are drawn to large cities. In 1971, fifty percent of Canadian artists lived in the Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver metropolitan areas. Moreover, they were further concentrated in the largest central cities, with high location quotients ranging between 2 and 3 for the different arts disciplines. There is a third level of spatial concentration, for within the central city, artists show a high level of centralisation, living in old neighbourhoods near the downtown and in the inner city. Around Toronto's CBD is a ring of census tracts with location quotients of 2.5 or more relative to the metropolitan distribution of artists.

There are functional reasons for this distribution -- available studio space and linkages with suppliers and markets -- but there is more to it than that. Downtown offers an intensity of stimulation, and also old neighbourhoods marginal to middle-class society, and valued because they allow a critical distance (in both senses) from middle-class life. As one Vancouver sculptor explained it: "Artists need authentic locations. You know artists hate the suburbs. They're too confining. Every artist is an anthropologist, unveiling culture. It helps to get some distance on that culture in an environment which does not share all of its presuppositions, an old area, socially diverse, including poverty groups" (Interview, summer 1992). Artists place a premium on sites that are devalued culturally as well as economically.

Note also the critical remarks concerning the suburbs. Here is a geographical reversal, a new topography of meaning raised over city space. The privileged centre is now the old inner city, while the suburbs are seen as containing the alienations of a conformist and commodified mass culture, the locus of what DEBORD identified as a society fallen asleep. Reviewing the spaces of the youth movement in Paris, LEFEBVRE (1969, pp. 117,119), too, contrasted the "social void" of the suburbs with the "utopian locality" of the centre.

The 1970s: Into the Job Market

Through the 1970s, the young adults of the 1960s entered the job market. Many turned to the burgeoning welfare state for employment, where they might retain some of their youthful idealism. During the 1970s, the glory years of the Canadian welfare state, more than half of college graduates gained employment in the public sector, either in government departments or health and education. Jobs in health, education and welfare expanded by more than half a million in the 1960s, and by a similar amount in the following decade. The largest share of public employees were graduates of arts and social science departments, who typically followed professional

and managerial career paths. A number retained their inner city locations from student days. So the City of Vancouver, for example, gained 10,000 residents aged 25-34 between 1971 and 1976. During this period, also, there was a marked upturn of income levels in the central city; 12,000 new households entered the top income bracket from 1972 to 1976 (City of Vancouver, 1977). Embourgeoisement was redefining the inner city.

In their residential choices, the professionals tended to follow the precedent of the artists. Indeed a quite remarkable residential progression is revealed which repeats the ranking of support by academic discipline for the student movement. Using data supplied by DANSEREAU and BEAUDRY (1985) I have identified 11 neighbourhoods in Montreal, five of which gentrified in the 1970s, while the remaining six gentrified in the 1980s. The authors supply figures on the degree of over- or underrepresentation of different occupational groups in these neighbourhoods relative to the mean for the Montreal metropolitan area. I have added these figures together for the two sets of five and six neighbourhoods (Table 1).

Table 1   Over- and Underrepresentation of Professional Subgroups in Montreal Neighbourhoods, 1981

	(a) Neighbourhoods that gentrified in 1980s	(b) Neighbourhoods that gentrified in 1970s
Artists	33	53
Social sciences	12	29
Education	3	48
Medicine	10	39
Natural sciences	-15	16
Managers/ administrators	-35	14

Source: Computed from data in DANSEREAU and BEAUDRY (1985)

Neighbourhoods gentrifying in the 1980s were, in 1981, near the beginning of the gentrification cycle (Table 1, column (a)). Note the high overrepresentation of artists, followed by occupations in the social sciences, education, and with underrepresentation for medicine, the natural sciences and, last of all, management, repeating with startling consistency the pattern of disciplinary support for the student movement. In contrast neighbourhoods that gentrified in the 1970s were, in 1981, much later in the cycle, and in these districts (Table 1, column (b)), all quaternary groups were overrepresented as interest in these districts had diffused from the artists, the location leaders, to other receptive professionals.

We see then the role of the artists as locational innovators, preparing a path that other professionals will follow, but in a distinctive sequence according to their ideological affiliation with *countercultural* values. Not surprisingly, correlation analysis

shows robust associations in Montreal (and also in Toronto, Vancouver and Ottawa) between the presence of artists in a census tract in 1971, and the tract's gentrification over the following decade.

These spatial relationships are sustained at even more aggregate geographical scales. In the six central cities as a whole, the most centralised of the major occupational groups in 1986 were artists, followed by occupations related to the social sciences, and then occupations related to religion, health care, teaching and the natural sciences (Table 2).

Table 2 Location Quotient of Residents, by Occupational Groups, in Central Cities Relative to Metropolitan Areas, 1986

	Six cities	Toronto	Montreal	Vancouver
Arts and related	149	225	137	149
Social sciences	144	201	128	144
Religion	137	121	159	99
Personal services	121	128	118	126
Medicine/ health	116	118	110	112
Teaching	107	119	100	103
Natural sciences	101	99	97	108
Other crafts/ equipment	96	95	104	102
Processing	95	84	110	98
Clerical	94	81	97	95
Sales	93	93	87	89
Product fabrication	91	82	113	96
Managerial/ admin	91	104	80	92
Construction	91	93	87	89
Transportation	88	71	89	77
Materials handling	83	75	103	87
Machining	79	61	93	72
Ag/ fish/ forest/ mines	76	77	67	75

All of these groups tended to be disproportionately concentrated in the central city. Replicating the position of antipathy toward the student movement in the 1960s, the least centralised of the quaternary work force were managers, who, unlike the professionals, tended to be underrepresented in the central city. The more adversarial the disciplinary field in the 1960s, and the higher the disposition toward the aesthetic, the more likely that the holders of jobs related to these fields twenty years later would be living in central city neighbourhoods. This is not simply a functional movement related to cost and distance: it is also a symbolic movement to a site that is perceived to support certain adversarial cultural identities.

So one finds that in old inner city neighbourhoods now occupied by the middle class, a critical cultural politics survives, a politics engaging the environmental and

women's movement, gay rights, social justice, and neighbourhood and heritage protection (CAULFIELD 1994; LEY 1994). Here the ideals of the 1960s are sustained.

Subversion: From Resistance to Collusion

One important step in my argument remains, for the adversarial culture in the central city is neither stable nor secure. As an interest in inner city living diffuses through the middle class to groups consecutively further from the countercultural core represented by the artist, so more conservative dispositions enter the gentrified inner city. Moreover, even critics may be insidiously co-opted, as the aesthetic ideology is domesticated into the art of living, the festival into a festival of consumption. The liberation of the sensuous, of individual self-determination may slide into self-contemplation, narcissism. Social as well as psychological arguments lead in the same direction. Like the counterculture, artists and their followers are primarily children of the middle class, and carry unexamined class interests. So apparently progressive struggles for heritage preservation, environmental improvement, or neighbourhood protection may have perverse consequences. By making neighbourhoods more desirable, they are creating a scarce good, and in the market place scarcity drives up prices. So it is that adversarial politics over the built environment may result in the housing displacement of the poor from gentrifying neighbourhoods, and their replacement by middle class groups later in the gentrification cycle, able to pay inflated prices for valuable inner city property, and much less concerned with issues of social justice. An ungenerous assessment would see the innovative ideas of the counterculture as the research and development that permitted the successful commodification of the aesthetic by entrepreneurs over the years to follow. As the art of living replaces a critical aesthetics, so the soft city of festival, community and spontaneity becomes incorporated within the calculus of the state and the market.

If this seems an excessive conclusion, consider the evolution of Yorkville, the core of Toronto's counterculture in the 1960s, a place then of street artists, American draft dodgers, and hippy coffee shops. Today it is a cornucopia of upscale consumption, and its principal mall is a suq-like bazaar called Hazelton Lanes. This aestheticised landscape has a history worth tracing, for its developer, Richard WOOKEY, perceptively anticipated the trajectory from the youth movement to gentrification. "In 1966 I saw all those 16 year old kids in Yorkville" he recalled at the opening of the Lanes in 1976. "I thought: 10 years from now they will be 26. They will want Yorkville, but a different kind. They will be consumers. And they will be more sophisticated" (FERRANTE and WARD 1976). WOOKEY frequently visited the beaches in the south of France, his father's home, and understood intuitively their sensuous desires. In true postmodern irony, Yorkville consummates the epigram of 1968: beneath the paving stones the beach!

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RECYCLING URBAN LANDSCAPES - BEYOND THE POWER

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The urban landscape is a cultural product of social change. It connects architecture, urban planning and economy to urban form, and simultaneously reflects and hides the existing power structures. A typical change that has been taking place in urban development is that from state institutions or other unambiguous institutions of power to the power blocs of industry and commerce, and to the new concepts of growth and effectiveness characteristic of those blocs. Internationalized production and consumption have meant a more international form, or postmodern urban identity, which reflects fragmented and more problematic forms of power.

This paper examines the relationships between urban renewal processes involving the reuse of built-up environments and the power structures behind those renewal processes. The intention is to specify the different meanings of the urban landscape (historical, cultural, functional, and structural) and the changing concepts of power relations (material vs. symbolic, local preferences vs. multinational claims, individual vs. collective). As a specific example, the processes in which a former industrial space, the 'Verkatehdas textile mill' in the inner city area of Turku is been transformed into a luxurious housing and service unit 'Verkahovi'. Industrial power based on production is replaced by a power bloc of urban marketing systems which offer future forms of urban living instead of traditional urban life.

The interpretation of an urban landscape

The spatial form of a city is the outcome of a variety of social, economic and political processes, and the factors contributing to it serve to depict certain historical situations which are part of a larger social reality but will explain the changes which have taken place in the urban landscape at particular moments in time. Any city will yield examples of physical and social environments which have been created at different periods in time and under different historical conditions. The economic and social processes describing the structure and functioning of the society in which the town is located determine the nature and extent of the spatial variants to be found within its economic and social functions ('power structures') and the influence that these have on certain urban landscapes inside the city. The power structures in society and the allocation of resources form the key to understanding and interpreting the processes of change in urban landscape.

In his numerous works published between 1975 and 1980, PAHL combines the view of various groups exercising different degrees of power within society with the concept of urban managerialism. PAHL's 'managerialist thesis', derived from urban conflict theory and notions of the post-industrial state, provides a framework for research which points to the existence of a set of factors governing the allocation of urban functions, comprising the representatives of the building companies, property agents and local authorities. By studying the activities of these people and the

institutions they stand for, one can move towards an understanding of the functioning of urban markets. The institutional approach is very useful for classifying 'urban managers' as producers, consumers and changers of urban land. As the initiators of structural changes, private developers (producers of urban land) have been the true architects of the urban spatial structure and urban landscape. Even though the developers are operating in an unstable system consisting of the value judgments of private individuals, and under increasing public surveillance, they are still able to assume the dominant role, since they are producers of the majority of the new buildings which households and businesses come to occupy (cf. BOURNE 1976: 539).

Urban models conceived of within the managerial frame of reference take account of the historical dimension to a certain extent and bear a direct relationship to other, broader social processes, but even so, doubts have arisen regarding the capacity of such an approach to comprehend the real nature of society and its influence upon urban processes and the socio-spatial forms within cities. The development of a political economy approach has meant the adoption of a more critical view of changes in urban structure. Instead of institutional conflicts and constraints, urban growth should be viewed as one aspect of a more extensive process of social development, and an urban structure as a product of this development at a given point in time. This also means that 'the faces of power' are more complicated than they are assumed to be in the case of institutional explanations. The spatial restructuring of the city is organized by various 'place entrepreneurs' who practice the politics of local economic development by forming growth coalitions. In their book 'Urban fortunes: the political economy of place', LOGAN and MOLOTCH (1987) speak about 'systemic power', which is a result of business people's continuous interaction with public officials. The organization of the growth coalitions ('the growth machine') included anybody who became an entrepreneur in a particular place: politicians, local media, public utilities, financial institutions, even including universities and cultural organizations. Later (e.g. HARVEY 1989, COUCH 1990) this relationship between the private sector and the public sector ('private-public partnership') seemed to rise to the status of a leading instrument for urban development, especially in urban renewal.

The postmodern debate in the late 1980's also emphasized the meaning of the urban landscape as part of a set of changing power relations (see ZUKIN 1988, 1991, 1992, and KNOX 1993). ZUKIN in particular integrates the urban landscape with structural forces and political, economic and cultural institutions: "The constant rebuilding of cities in core capitalist societies suggests that the major condition of architectural production is to create shifting material landscapes. These landscapes bridge space and time; they also directly mediate economic power by both conforming to and structuring norms of market-driven investment, production and consumption" (ZUKIN 1988: 435). Later ZUKIN emphasizes that new architecture and urban forms are produced under almost the same social conditions as consumer products (1991: 42). In urban renewal, especially concerning the reuse and recycling of urban built-up environments, the power structure is more fragmented than earlier, consisting of various consumption and cultural experts, estate investors and more or

less obscure business circles. (Post)-modern urban landscapes are organized around principles of consumption rather than production, which means a new and different way of interpreting them. As KNOX (1993: 3) puts it: "The built environment, then, must be seen as simultaneously dependent and conditioning, outcome and mechanism of the dynamics of investments, production and consumption... approaching the built environment in these terms presents a considerable challenge".

In terms of the urban landscape, the postmodern trend reflects the city of signs and various species of information. The scheme in Figure 1 follows the idea of interpreting urban landscapes in the field of cultural semiotics (see BENGS and his applications of Juri LOTMAN's text analysis to urban planning - 'the city as a cultural text', 1993). In this scheme the sender represent various power structures (from urban managerialism to the postmodern debate), the receiver is a city resident, and the urban landscape is a result of the exercise of power ('text'). The cultural context is a society reflecting the imperatives of cultural, economic, political and social forces at particular times. The sender communicates with the receiver through the urban landscape. In this sense the urban landscape is full of remains representing the exercise of power at different periods in time (old industrial buildings or areas are connected with historical urban activities, industrial capitalists, organized labour, estate investors, business circles etc.).

The shift in urban meaning from production to consumption has blurred the distinctions between market and non-market norms. ZUKIN maintains that there are two cultural products that most directly map the landscape: architecture and urban form. Neither is free of market forces and the attachments of place nor entirely bound by them. Where changing urban landscapes are concerned, ZUKIN also emphasizes the concept of liminality (or 'liminal space') which mediates between nature and the artifice, public use and private value, global markets and local space. The commercialization of urban architecture (and urban planning) reflects the increasing commercialization of the social category of design, which means that the liminal experience is broadened so that new urban spaces are formed, permeated, and defined by liminality (see ZUKIN 1991: 41-42). Liminal spaces complicate the effort to construct a spatial identity, which means that mapping the urban landscape entails admitting more interpretations than in the earlier periods of urban development... and at the same time it has broadened in meaning to include an appreciation of material culture ('the landscape as material culture'), a linguistic metaphor ('the landscape as text'), an economic activity ('the financial landscape'), a cognitive construct ('the abstract landscape) and an existing social order, 'the historical landscape' (see ROWNTREE 1986: 580-581 and ZUKIN 1992: 223-224).

The most typical examples of 'landscape manipulation' have taken place in the interior space of the city when reorganizing the quality of urban living (c.f. gentrification, new consumption areas and sophisticated entertainment). Many traditional urban shopping districts are undergoing metamorphoses from realistic to artificial environments. Senders who communicate with city dwellers via shopping

Figure 1   Interpreting an urban landscape as part of a body of information sent and received


districts have connections with architects, estate investors and international investments which are transforming districts from locations of crafts to sites of mass production and consumption. On the other hand, landscape manipulation also refers to the restoration and redevelopment of older locales, their abstraction from a logic of mercantile or industrial capitalism and their renewal as up-to-date consumption spaces behind the red-brick or cast-iron façade of the past (ZUKIN 1992: 222). Reuse (recycling) of urban landscapes has led to accelerated land use, which in some cases defies the traditional methods of urban planning. The focus of investors (and local authorities) has shifted from sustained long-term yield from property to speculation in land and short-term development rights (BOURNE 1991: 188). This also means a shift in power structures - or at least a situation in which the so-called postmodern urban landscape has more 'senders' and more 'speculators' who are willing to participate in new action on the urban scene. Where the industrial order of the modern city created homogeneity, rationality, mass production and modern residential developments as part of urban living and understanding, the (post)industrial order of the (post)modern city has created plurality, flexibility, small batch production and fragmentation - a process in which recycled urban landscapes are fruitful for all kind of experimentation in urban marketing and future urban life.

Recycling urban landscapes

The reuse of existing urban areas has become prevalent in the course of the intensification of land use in the city centres and the redevelopment of old industrial and waterfront areas. This has indeed been the predominant form of development in many western market societies - e.g. over half of the new urban land use in Great Britain is now taking place through projects for the reuse of built environments. David HARVEY (1985: 3-7) characterizes the economic process whereby consumption has become dominant over production as a movement of capital away from the primary circuit (capital flows in the production process) to the secondary circuit (involving the capital which flows into fixed assets in the built environment and into the consumption fund, see Figure 2). The gradual erosion of the 'industrial hegemony' is encouraged by a number of circumstances which arise periodically within the process of de-industrialization (overproduction, falling rates of industrial profit, the lack of investment opportunities etc.). Instead of traditional investments in industrial growth, these factors lead to 'flexible accumulation', when too much capital is produced relative to the available opportunities to employ it. Financial institutions and estate investors seeking to invest their considerable pools of capital in projects with maximal returns, invest more readily in the built environment under conditions of flexible accumulation (cf. TWEEDALE 1988: 189). In periods of general prosperity, redevelopment of the built environment is one lucrative form of investment and property speculation. The latest ideas have been to recycle existing buildings or built environments, 'a cultural act' which hides the investor's potential profits.

Figure 2   Transformation of urban space - primary and secondary circuits of capital

There has been a number of renewal projects in Finnish cities since the mid-1980's, mainly concerning the intensification of land use in city centres and the reuse of old inner city industrial areas. One common feature of all these projects has been the miscellaneous nature of the land use agreements reached between the property owners and the local authorities. A typical solution is that property owners submit to conditions which impose more financial burdens on them than under the regulations of the Building Act, in exchange for a greater permitted building volume, which will increase the value of the property. Land use agreements usually contain various stipulations which should allow the local authorities to influence the implementation of the land use plans, but even so it has been the practice that quite extensive responsibility and latitude in the renewal process has been delegated from the public to the private sector. This could lead to excessive sameness and expense in urban renewal, and, what is particular important, a slackening of local government responsibility for the urban landscape. In most cases of redevelopment, local politicians have to learn a new way of handling land use policy. Traditional policy was connected with the supply of 'raw land', and usually took the form of contractual agreements between the city authorities and building companies (developers). In the recycling of urban space, however, the private sector is more fragmented, and local government is actually uncertain as to what it is supplying and to whom.

Most of the old industrial buildings or districts in the inner city area of Turku are owned by the city council itself or estate investors, as summarized in Table 1.

Table 1   Owners of old industrial premises in the inner city area of Turku
(arrows indicate directions of changes in power relations)

owner / location	industrialists	city of Turku (or state)	building companies (developers)	estate investors ('business circles')
city centre (CBD)	2	5 *marketing companies* ———————→	-	8
downtown (including harbour)	13	13 *board members* - - - - - - - →	5	18
riverfront	-	6	2 *estate agents* ———————→	6
total (78)	15	24	7	32

Only a few premises are in the possession of industrialists. Typically, the industrialists have either sold their industrial spaces or established marketing companies for the purpose of negotiating good zoning contracts for future

redevelopment or recycling of these areas. The private sector has also been active in taking over industrial premises predominantly occupying or located adjacent to sites which offer the greatest private sector development potential and financial returns - in most cases in the city centre or waterfront area (cf. LOFTMAN 1994: 1). The power relations that lie beyond these reproduced urban landscapes and the meaning of 'urban function' also reflect future forms of urban living - different from the typically gentrified urban areas. The chronology of the development of the Verkatehdas textile mill in Turku gives an example of a recycling process in which the industrial building and its environment have been used for a number of purposes during this century.

Chronology of the transformation of the Verkatehdas textile mill

The history of the Verkatehdas textile mill and its nearby environment from the old industrial space to the luxurious housing and service unit 'Verkahovi' is described in Table 2. These developmental phases reflect interpretative changes in the urban landscape, various power structures lying behind the process of urban renewal and more or less manipulated expectations regarding (future) urban living.

Table 2   Chronology of the transformation of the Verkatehdas textile mill in the inner city area of Turku

1875 Master dyer Johan Limnell founds a weaving mill and dyehouse on the banks of the River Aura.

1885 Johan Limnell is declared bankrupt and a new textile company is founded by a group of businessmen.

1905 Working-class suburbs begin to develop in the area between the textile mill and the River Aura, producing a tightly meshed clump of city streets by around 1910.

1938 First red-brick factory building erected, a landmark for the industrial area.

1950 Second red-brick building erected, the last factory building in the area, completing the formation of the industrial landscape. The working-class suburb next to the mill has preserved its social content and physical features.

1964 The Hyvilla corporation, the last industrial owner of the Verkatehdas area, goes bankrupt, and the Union Bank of Finland becomes the new owner. The bank forms two property companies, Ekku Oy and Tervatori Oy, to organize the future redevelopment of the area. The first red-brick factory building is rented out to various small companies, mainly for industrial purposes. The second remains empty.

1982 The Union Bank of Finland sells the second building, that administered by Tervatori Oy, to the construction company Polar. The gentrification process is gradually beginning in the old working-class suburb.

1986 The Polar company decides to demolish some of the old factory buildings. A local citizens' organization Enemmistö ('Majority') lodges a proposal that it should be protected as a historical industrial site. The National Board of Antiquities and Historical Monuments suggests preservation under the zoning regulations. The building company nevertheless demolishes some of the buildings and starts work on a new, expensive housing area. Social and physical gentrification is total and irreversible.

1990 The Union Bank of Finland applies for changes in the zoning regulations concerning the remaining factory building. The bank and the building company Haka form a property company Verkahovi Oy to convert the old industrial site to consumer use. The insurance company Apollo raises the idea of building suites for elderly people financed out of their retirement pension insurances. The leases of the small companies occupying the building expire. All activity in the area is suspended on account of the recession. Haka and Apollo both go bankrupt.

1993 The Union Bank of Finland revives its earlier plan to transform the industrial building into housing and service premises (restaurant, solarium, medical centre, library, swimming and bathing pool etc.). The four cornerstones of the project are: finance of apartments (Union Bank of Finland and the Stella insurance company owned by it), finance of service premises (Finnish Slot Machine Association - a private investment company), suitable buyers for investment stock (Turku University Foundation and the Foundation of the Swedish-language university Åbo Akademi) and the marketing of suites (retirement pension insurances, a 'personal way to live').

The Verkatehdas textile mill is one of the four old industrial districts of any size in the inner city area of Turku. Industrial operations began there in 1875, when the master dyer Johan Limnell founded a weaving mill and dyehouse on the banks of the River Aura, and continued until the 1950's, when the last of the eight industrial buildings was erected. The ninety-year history of the industrial urban landscape ended in 1964, when the owner at that time, the industrial corporation Hyvilla Oy, went bankrupt and the Verkatehdas area passed into the hands of a bank. The mill had been part of a power block maintained by textile industrialists, which had greatly affected the urban history and autonomy of the city, even though Turku was never such a powerful 'textile town' as Tampere, for example. The Verkatehdas site and the working-class suburbs surrounding it were signs of quite unambiguous social relations between a 'sender' and a 'receiver'. People understood the meaning of industrial work in everyday life, and they were able to connect this interpretation with the cultural context of a growing modern city.

The events of the last thirty years point to conflicts, changes in ownership and speculations concerning the future use of the former industrial area. The short boom at the end of the 1980's led to extraordinary economic and political manipulations in the urban world of Finnish society, which in the case of the Verkatehdas site meant the demolition of some of the old industrial buildings (in spite of public appeals and suggestions by central government authorities). The second phase in the urban transformation started in 1993, this time through the medium of complicated marketing systems. The owner, the Union Bank of Finland, was not willing to take any risks in the redevelopment process (cf. the bank crisis in Finland in the early 1990's). A new marketing system was created around four cornerstones: financing of apartments by the bank itself and Stella, an insurance company owned by it, financing of the service premises by the Finnish Slot Machine Association, a private investment company, the finding of suitable buyers for investment stock, the Turku University Foundation and the foundation of the Swedish-language university, Åbo Akademi, and the marketing of suites for retired persons, funded out of their pension insurances and advertised as representing a 'personal way to live'. The first three of these solutions tell us something of the multifarious power structures in which the various estate investors were involved, including both private and public sector operators, while the fourth 'suites for a personal way of life' serves as a sign of the nature of future urban living - and its financing.

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S. Illeris
Why was the Central City Population Stabilized?
The Case of Copenhagen

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

WHY WAS THE CENTRAL CITY POPULATION STABILIZED?
THE CASE OF COPENHAGEN

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In the 1980s, a stabilisation in the number of people in the core has been observed in many West European cities. In the paper, the causes of this stabilisation in the case of Copenhagen are analyzed. The following factors are concluded to play a role: (1) An increased attraction of persons aged 20-34, some of whom are well-to-do ("gentrification"), but more are under education, "social losers", or international immigrants. (2) The thinning out of the old population of mid-age and elderly blue-collar workers and housewives has now proceeded so far that the "reservoir" has almost been emptied. (3) The building of new ownership housing in the periphery has - for a number of economic and legal reasons - been radically reduced, which has forced people to remain in the existing housing stock. (4) Urban renewal and house-building in derelict areas, on the other hand, has not played an important role. And (5) the hypothesis that the saving of energy costs should be a factor can be discarded.

Ever since urbanisation gained pace - in most European countries in the 19th century - and the growing population could not be contained in the older city cores, an intra-urban process of suburbanisation has taken place, in recent decades even developing into exurbanisation: Residences and inhabitants expanded centrifugally, while at the same time the population in the older, central parts of the cities declined. Firms and working places, on the other hand, remained much longer in the central parts of the cities. So massive centripetal commuting movements evolved. A main planning problem was to create sufficient traffic capacity to cope with these concentrated flows, especially in rush hours.

In the 1980s, there are indications that these processes have come to an end in many cities, and that new intra-urban structures emerge. In many cities, the suburbanisation of working places is reported to accelerate, giving rise to phenomena like "edge cities". On the other hand, the population living in the central parts of the cities seems to stabilize - a phenomenon which is documented for instance by BOURNE (1991) and by two major EU reports (DREWETT, KNIGHT & SCHUBERT 1992, and European Institute of Urban Affairs 1992).

Copenhagen is a case in which both of these new tendencies are observed, as witnessed by Table 1. In this table, the central or core communes of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg, which include the area up to 5 km's from the city centre, are compared to the rest of the metropolitan region, up to 50 km's from the city centre. (It should be noted that the working place data are not totally comparable from 1970 to 1982, but the main tendencies are certain enough).

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Table 1   Place of living and working of the economically active population in the Copenhagen region, 1970-1991 (Thousand persons. In parenthesis: Share of region)

	Copenhagen + Frederiksberg communes		Rest of region		Copenhagen region total	
Place of living						
1970	361	(40)	534	(60)	895	(100)
1982	270	(30)	637	(70)	907	(100)
1991	256	(29)	638	(71)	894	(100)
Place of working (1)						
1970	476	(53)	429	(47)	905	(100)
1982	409	(44)	527	(56)	935	(100)
1991	353	(38)	573	(62)	926	(100)
In-commuters (2)						
1970	218	(53)	191	(47)	409	(100)
1982	229	(46)	275	(54)	503	(100)
1991	208	(37)	348	(63)	556	(100)

(1)   except persons with unknown or shifting places of work, but including in-commuters from outside the region.

(2)   persons living and working in different communes.

Table 1 clearly shows that while in the 1970s suburbanisation of both dwellings and jobs of the active population took place - the former slightly stronger than the latter - the 1980s have been a decade of only decentralisation of working places, while the distribution of the (active) population according to place of living has stabilized. The ever increasing commuting movements naturally follow the places of work. So the planning problem is now one of much more diffuse commuting flows which are difficult for the public transport to capture.

In this paper, I shall focus only on the stabilisation of the central city population. The above-mentioned EU reports do not try to analyze the question of *why* this stabilisation has occurred. The purpose of this paper will be to discuss its causes, on the basis of the Copenhagen case. But first it will be necessary to describe the process in much more detail. Are the groups which nourished the out-migration from the central communes declining, are new groups coming in and stabilizing the number of inhabitants?

S. Ileris
Why was the Central City Population Stabilized?
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Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

The region of Copenhagen (see Figures 1 and 2) will be subdivided into the following areas (1-3 form the core or central communes):

1. The Inner City: the historical centre and the 19th century multi-storey extensions (Østerbro, Nørrebro, Vesterbro and Amagerbro, in Tables 2 and 3 also Sundbyøster Nord).
2. The Outer Districts of the commune of Copenhagen, early 20th century mixed building areas.
3. The commune of Frederiksberg, an enclave in the commune of Copenhagen with higher standard residences.
4. The county of Copenhagen, a ring roughly 5-20 km's from the city centre.
5. The county of Frederiksborg, the northern periphery of the region.
6. The county of Roskilde, the western periphery of the region.

The evidence presented in this paper is exclusively taken from official statistics. These are good and reliable, compared to data in many countries, but it has not been possible to compare data on all characteristics of the population.

Migration within the Copenhagen region

Table 2 shows the distribution of the total population of the region.

Table 2   Population in the Copenhagen region 1970-1993 (thousands)

Area	6.11.1970	1.1.1981	1.1.1993
Cop. comm., Inner City*	336	259	244
Cop. comm., Outer districts	287	235	223
Frederiksberg commune	102	88	87
Copenhagen county	615	625	604
Frederiksborg county	259	330	346
Roskilde county	153	203	221
Copenhagen region	1753	1740	1725

* Including 2000-3000 persons with no fixed address

According to Table 2, the total population has stabilized in the 1980s in all parts of the central communes. At the same time, population growth has turned into decline in the suburban ring of the county of Copenhagen, and it has strongly decelerated in the peripheral counties.

S. Illeris
Why was the Central City Population Stabilized?
The Case of Copenhagen

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

Figure 1   Total Net Migration in the Copenhagen Region 1973-1992 (in thousands)

S. Illeris
Why was the Central City Population Stabilized?
The Case of Copenhagen

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Band 52, Berlin 1994

Figure 2   Population in the Copenhagen region 1901 - 1992

Source: Københavns kommune 1994

In Table 3, these total changes have been broken down to the components of internal (domestic) and international net migration and national growth in selected sub-periods. Figure 1 shows net migration each year since 1973.

As elsewhere, natural growth has influenced population change in the Copenhagen region. The birth surplus decreased in peripheral zones and the birth deficit increased in the core until the first half of the 1980s, then took a more positive direction. These developments happened in more or less parallel ways everywhere in the region, however. The cause of the difference between core and periphery is above all the different age structures.

The variations in population change between the various parts of the region are primarily due to the migration pattern.

The 1970s showed the traditional pattern (in Table 3 represented by the years 1976-78), with heavy net migration from the core, and to a small degree from the suburban ring, to the peripheral zones, though these flows had already started to decline. International migration only played a minor role.

S. Illeris
Why was the Central City Population Stabilized?
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Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

Table 3   Population change and its components 1973-92 (annual rates per 1000 inhabitants)

Area	Internal migration					International migration				
	76-78	80-82	84-86	87-89	90-92	76-78	80-82	84-86	87-89	90-92
Cop. comm., Inner City*	-18.6	1.8	-0.2	3.9	1.9	0.8	0.1	3.7	0.9	3.5
Cop. comm., Outer distr.	-18.2	-0.7	-6.0	2.0	-1.3	1.0	0.1	1.0	1.0	2.3
Frederiksberg commune	-8.5	11.8	3.0	5.6	10.2	-0.5	-0.6	0.6	-0.2	2.6
Copenhagen county	-5.3	-5.0	-6.1	-4.2	-1.4	0.7	-0.4	0.9	0.3	1.7
Frederiksborg county	13.6	0.3	2.6	-1.7	0	1.1	-0.6	2.3	0.6	2.0
Roskilde county	13.2	3.2	6.7	1.8	1.4	1.7	-0.4	1.5	0.8	1.7
Copenhagen region	-3.9	-0.6	-1.5	-0.5	0.3	0.9	-0.3	1.6	0.6	2.1
	Natural growth					Total population change				
Cop. comm., Inner City*	-11.2	-12.9	-12.0	-6.5	-5.2	-29.0	-11.0	-8.6	-1.7	0.2
Cop. comm., Outer distr.	-3.6	-4.6	-5.0	-5.6	-2.2	-20.8	-5.2	-10.0	-2.6	-1.1
Frederiksberg commune	-8.9	-10.7	-9.6	-9.0	-6.7	-17.9	0.5	-5.9	-3.7	6.0
Copenhagen county	4.1	1.3	0.2	0.6	1.3	-0.5	-4.0	-5.1	-3.3	1.7
Frederiksborg county	5.9	2.5	1.9	2.5	3.0	20.5	2.2	6.7	1.4	4.9
Roskilde county	5.9	2.7	1.9	2.8	3.6	20.7	5.6	10.2	5.4	6.7
Copenhagen region	0.5	-1.9	-2.3	-1.0	0.1	-2.6	-2.8	-2.2	-1.0	2.6

* Including 2000-3000 persons with no fixed address

In the 1980s, a different pattern emerged. The migration pattern of the Inner City and especially the commune of Frederiksberg turned positive. This means that the two core communes from 1981 to 1991 received 8000 in-migrants net instead of losing 165,000, as they would have done had the 1973-75 tendency (not shown in the Table) continued. The balance of the Outer Districts of the commune of Copenhagen, on the other hand side, remained negative. The net migration into the peripheral counties of Frederiksborg and Roskilde decreased substantially. From 1981 to 1991 they received 110,000 fewer net migrants than they would have got, had the 1973-75 tendency continued. In the period 1984-86 and from 1990, international net migration contributed significantly to the total population change.

One might say that the outward growth wave and the thinning out behind it almost came to a stop about 1980 - though a small wave into the peripheral counties and some thinning out in the older suburban ring continued to operate. A completely new phenomenon was the net migration into the Inner City and the commune of Frederiksberg. In the case of the Inner City, it consisted partly of international immigration, primarily from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Pakistan and Morocco.

There are, however, fluctuations in the pattern of the last decade. The net flows from the suburban rings into the peripheral counties were strongest from 1983 to 86

S. Illeris
Why was the Central City Population Stabilized?
The Case of Copenhagen

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

(a boom period). They were considerably weaker in the early 1980s as well as in the early 90s (recession periods). The Copenhagen region had an improved migration balance against the rest of the country in the recession periods, and this has contributed to increased gains in the core communes and reduced losses in the county of Copenhagen in these periods.

The demographic structure of the central communes

The analysis of the changing number of people is not enough to understand the causes of the stabilisation in the core communes. Even if the total population has stabilized, its composition still changes, and these processes must to investigated in order to perceive the total dynamics. Hence, first the changing demographic and, second, the socio-economic composition of the population must be mapped. The focus will be exclusively on the central communes, and in order to follow the processes of change, the 1960s will be included in the analysis.

Table 4 shows the particular age structure in the central communes. I order to eliminate the influence of baby booms (all over Denmark in the 1940s, 60s and 90s) and the low number of births in the 1930s, 70s and 80s, the age structure is compared to Denmark as a whole.

In central Copenhagen, there is a relative surplus of young people in the 20-24 age bracket, due to a net migration gain in the 15-24 age bracket. This surplus has gradually increased.

Table 4   Age distribution of population in core communes, 1960-93

Per cent of total	26.9.1960		1.1.1971		1.1.1980		1.1.1994	
	Cop. and Fr. berg	Den-mark	Cop. and Fr. berg	Den-mark	Cop. and Fr. berg	Den-mark	Cop. and Fr. berg	Den-mark
0-4	5.9	8.0	5.4	7.7	4.2	6.3	5.4	6.3
5-14	12.7	17.1	9.7	15.5	8.1	14.8	6.5	10.8
15-19	7.7	8.4	5.8	7.5	5.1	7.6	3.9	6.5
20-24	7.3	6.6	9.9	8.3	9.0	7.3	10.5	7.2
25-34	11.4	12.3	13.4	14.1	16.0	15.5	22.7	15.5
35-44	13.3	13.3	9.4	11.4	10.0	12.8	12.8	14.3
45-54	15.4	13.0	13.2	12.0	9.9	10.7	11.3	14.2
55-64	13.1	10.5	15.2	11.1	13.7	10.7	7.8	9.7
65+	13.1	10.6	18.0	12.4	23.9	14.3	19.1	15.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

There is also a relative surplus of persons over 65. It increased up to 1980, but has declined rather dramatically since then. The old generations die, and the age class is not fed by any in-migration.

On the other hand, there was in 1960 a relative deficit in the 25-39 age bracket (the parent generation) and among children, accompanied by net out-migration. After 1980, this deficit only exists among those over 35, while a huge surplus has developed in the 25-34 age bracket, and the net out-migration has almost disappeared. There is still a deficit of children (fertility is low in central Copenhagen), but among young children it has been reduced.

The mid-age brackets, 40-64, displayed a surplus in 1960, but from 1980 this turned into a considerable deficit (see Figure 2).

Demographically, the central communes have traditionally had two other main characteristics, namely a relative large surplus of women and a relatively large number of singles. In 1994 for instance, 52.5 per cent of the population were women, against 50.7 per cent in the country as a whole. And in 1993, 67 per cent of the central city "families" were childless singles, against 50 per cent in the country as a whole. ("Families" are defined as single adults or couples living together, plus possible children - marital statistics have become irrelevant in Denmark since the 1970s, since many couples live together without being married).

Table 5 shows the development in these variables. Since "family" data only are available for a few years, mean household size has been used as a substitute, households being defined as all persons living at a given address (before 1980, the definition was slightly narrower).

Table 5 shows a slight decrease in the share of women in central Copenhagen since 1980, and a stabilisation of household sizes, relative to the development in the country as a whole. These observations fit well with the relative decline of the elderly population in central Copenhagen (with many single women), and with the relative growth in the age brackets 25-39 and 0-4, where men and non-single-person households are better represented.

Table 5   Share of women, and mean household size, 1960-1994

	Share of women			Mean household size	
	Cop. + Fr. berg	Denmark		Cop. + Fr. berg	Denmark
1960	53.2	50.4	1960	2.47	2.90
1971	53.2	50.3	1970	2.13	2.67
1980	53.7	50.7	1983	1.85	2.42
1990	53.1	50.7	1990	1.74	2.27
1994	52.5	50.7	1994	1.75	2.22

S. Illeris
Why was the Central City Population Stabilized?
The Case of Copenhagen

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

The socio-economic structure of the central communes

Several studies show the special socio-economic composition of the central city population, in particular the high number of receivers of welfare payments and of social services (e.g. ANDERSEN et al. 1985). However, it is difficult to get data that show the development over time. In Table 6, the population in the 15-64 age bracket is split into (A) economically active persons (including receivers of unemployment payments), who are subdivided into wage earners (blue collar workers) and salary earners (white collar) plus independent firm owners. And (B) an estimate of non-active persons, including housewives, persons under education, and persons living from various transfer payments (estimated as the difference between all persons in this age bracket and all active persons, and hence too low because some active persons are over 64 years old). Definitions and data registration methods vary over time, so only main trends may be considered reliable.

Table 6 indicates that the decline in the 15-64 age bracket primarily has hit the blue collar population. Indeed, in 1960 the central commune (and in particular its inner districts) could be called a predominantly working class area, with manual workers, their wives and children, plus retired workers. By 1990, the blue collar workers have all but disappeared - and especially so in the Inner City. The share of wage earners has declined in the country as a whole, but not at all at the same pace. Unemployment is high in the commune of Copenhagen: in November 1990, 11.4 per cent against 8.7 per cent in Denmark as a whole, and since it primarily hits unskilled workers, many of the remaining blue collar workers are undoubtedly unemployed. The number of independents plus white collar workers has remained surprisingly constant.

Finally, the number of non-active residents in this age bracket declined until 1980, but seems to have increased in the 80s, especially in the Inner City. From other sources it is known that housewives - in 1960 the most numerous component - have almost totally disappeared. There can be no doubt that the recent increase of non-actives is due to an increasing number of young people under education (with various sources of income) and of persons living on welfare payments.

We may summarize the shifts in the composition of central city population in the following way: By 1960, the dominating group was blue collar workers and their housewives, with an over-representation of the age classes over 40, and an above-average number of elderly persons. There was also an emerging over-representation of persons in their early twenties.

Since 1980, considerable changes have occurred. The blue collar workers and the housewives have all but disappeared (probably most of the remaining ones are immigrants, but there are no data to highlight this). The number of retired persons is, after a culmination in the 1970s, declining. Instead, the population in the 20-34 age bracket is now over-represented, accompanied by an increasing number of very young children. Most of the inhabitants are under education, living on welfare payments, or white collar workers. And most are single persons. All of these shifts

S. Illeris
Why was the Central City Population Stabilized?
The Case of Copenhagen

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

Table 6 Socio-economic composition of the commune of Copenhagen, 1960-90 (in thousands)

Inner City		1960	1970	1980	1990
Age					
0-14		62	45	27	23
15-64	Wage earners	106	78	45	31
	Salary earners + indep.	84	77	79	86
	non-active	55	48	34	44
65 +		54	58	50	39
Total		362	306	236	222

Outer districts		1960	1970	1980	1990
Age					
0-14		75	51	32	28
15-64	Wage earners	98	76	48	38
	Salary earners + indep.	88	85	79	80
	non-active	62	52	32	36
65 +		37	51	66	63
Total		359	316	258	245

have been most pronounced in the Inner City, but also observed in the outer districts of the commune of Copenhagen.With this notion of the processes of shift in the composition of population, we can return to our initial question: Why did the population stabilize in the 1980s? Why did the growth in some population segments accelerate enough to compensate the continued decrease in other segments ?

Factors behind the stabilisation of the central city population

The traditional migration pattern in the Copenhagen region, as in other major urban regions, could be explained by two factors. The outward wave of migration was partly pulled by the construction of new housing on the ever moving periphery of the built up area, and partly pushed by the size reduction in the households who lived in the older stock of housing.

The fundamental changes which took place about 1980 require new explanations, however, except for the suburban ring where the "thinning out" continues. Why has a "turnaround" occurred in the Inner City, which now has a positive migration balance in Copenhagen as well as in other big European cities? And why has the net migration to the periphery decreased so much?

S. Illeris
Why was the Central City Population Stabilized?
The Case of Copenhagen

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

Several hypotheses have been put forward. In the following section they will be discussed briefly, continuing the discussion in ILLERIS (1983). First, hypotheses concerned with the size of the moving groups will be discussed.

Increasing in-migration of new groups. The increased in-migration of young people as well as the new relative surplus of persons in the 25-34 age bracket in the 1980s indicate a growing attraction of groups who earlier were not very important in the population of the central communes.

The influx has often been connected with gentrification, understood as a socio-economic process by which well-to-do (especially childless) households should move "back to the city" with its truly urban, high density environments and its proximity to many people and services, in contrast to this group's earlier low density preferences. There is no doubt that this has happened in some cases, in Copenhagen as well as in other cities it is easy to point out "gentrified" areas.

In this connection, it may be argued that we must drop the notion of all-embracing changes of preferences such as a "green wave" in the 1970s followed by gentrification in the 80s. In general, the shift from an "Industrial" or "Fordist" to a "Service" or "Post-Fordist" society is supposed to be connected with more segmented markets and individualized tastes. This is probably also the case in the residential sphere: Preferences for low densities and for dense urban environments may very well exist in different groups of the population and both be realized when people can afford it.

However, the increased influx observed in the demographic statistics may also consist of less well-to-do persons. There is actually a good deal of evidence to indicate that gentrification is rather the exception than the main cause of the Inner City stabilisation:

- According to Table 6, both the number of salaried persons (plus independents) and the (under-estimated) number of non-active persons have increased in the 1980s, especially in the Inner City, but the latter more than the former.
- The above-average unemployment rate in the commune of Copenhagen has increased: In November 1980 it was 0.6 percentage points over the national average, but in November 1990 2.7 percentage points above.
- The mean taxable income in the commune of Copenhagen was in 1980 7 per cent over the national average, but in 1990 exactly the same as in the country as a whole.
- The commune of Copenhagen has above-average rates of crime as well as of disease and of deaths by suicide, alcoholism, drugs and lung cancer (ILLERIS 1984).
- A detailed study of all persons who moved into and out from the commune of Copenhagen in 1982 showed that the out-migrants in all socio-economic respects scored better than the in-migrants. Furthermore, the few immigrants who moved into good and big dwellings only stayed there for short periods (Københavns kommune 1994).

S. Illeris
Why was the Central City Population Stabilized?
The Case of Copenhagen

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

The less well-to-do persons are undoubtedly attracted to the central city by its cheap old housing stock. To illustrate the low quality, it may be mentioned that 67 p.c. of the dwellings in the commune of Copenhagen are under 80 square meters, against 33 p.c. in the country as a whole. The following sub-groups of less well-to-do persons may be distinguished:

- Young people under education. This group is increasing in the country as a whole. They prefer to live in the central city not only because of the cheap housing, but also because of the proximity to many schools, and many probably share the preferences for urban life of the "gentry".

- International immigrants clearly form another increasing group of the Inner City population. It is well known that immigrants usually prefer to live in big cities, and we already observed that in 1990-92, the growth of the population of the whole region was due to this factor. Furthermore, immigrants have a higher fertility than Danish citizens. However, the total number of aliens in the Inner City of Copenhagen by 1992 was only 24,000 or 10 per cent of the population (against 3 per cent in Denmark as a whole), a modest increase by 4000 persons since 1982 - by far not enough to explain the changed trend of population.

- "Social losers" of all kinds, attracted by cheap housing, possibly also by the anonymity of the Inner City environment, and in some cases forming special milieux. It is often assumed that this ill-defined group has been growing in the 1980s.

Altogether, a number of growing groups are attracted to central city and contribute to the stabilisation of its number of people.

Thinning out of the traditional out-migrant groups. On the other hand, the groups which traditionally have fed the net out-migration of persons over 40 years are thinning out, and these flows are smaller than before 1980. The working-class population, which must have contributed substantially, is by 1990 so reduced that it cannot give rise to much out-migration (just like the agricultural population in rural districts).

We shall now turn to hypotheses concerned with the motives for people to move or stay.

The saving of energy costs was a widespread hypothesis in the wake of the two oil price crises: People were supposed to concentrate in the Inner City in order to save heating and transport costs - both things being cheaper in the multi-storey houses of the Inner City, with short distances to many jobs and good public transport, than in the one-family houses of the periphery. However, as the oil prices have gone down without any real return to the old pattern of migration, this hypothesis can be discarded.

S. Illeris
Why was the Central City Population Stabilized?
The Case of Copenhagen

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

The construction of new housing might also explain the stabilisation. This has happened partly in urban renewal areas and partly on abandoned harbour, railway, industrial and similar sites. As regards old housing areas, for many years it has in Denmark been an objective of urban renewal policies to reduce densities in the 19th century areas - only recently this objective has been loosened. Consequently, the statistical district where most urban renewal has taken place, Inner Nørrebro, has seen its population decrease from 57,000 in 1970 (before the renewal started) to 34,000 in 1992, after the new housing had been built. Of course the process has contributed to a more positive population development during the rebuilding phase of the 80s than during the demolition phase of the 70s, but its total effect has been a clear reduction of population.

The total stock of dwellings in the Copenhagen region is shown in Table 7. Altogether, the number of dwellings in the core communes has, after a decrease in the Inner City in the 1970s, hardly changed in the 80s. However, a comparison with Table 2 shows that this stabilisation in the number of dwellings cannot explain the total stabilisation of population: Not only did the number of dwellings stabilize in the 1980s, but also the number of persons per dwelling (in the core communes 1970 2.2 persons, 1981 1.8 persons, 1992 1.7 persons).

Table 7   Number of dwellings in the Copenhagen region, 1970 - 1992

Thousands	1970	1981	1984	1987	1990	1992
Cop. comm., Inner City	160	148*	149	148	148	147
Cop. comm., Outer districts	126	125*	130	130	130	130
Frederiksberg commune	47	49	49	50	50	51
Copenhagen county	216	260	264	269	276	279
Frederiksborg county	87	122	127	133	139	141
Roskilde county	52	75	78	85	89	91
Copenhagen region	686	790	798	815	832	839

* 10,000 dwellings in the commune of Copenhagen not accounted for.

Economic barriers to new peripheral house-building. Table 7 leads to a new hypothesis. It might be the very modest construction of new housing in the periphery in the 1980s that was responsible, not only for the deceleration of net migration into these counties, but also for the stabilisation of the population of the core. In this hypothesis, it is not changed preferences and hence reduced demand that has caused the slow-down of new peripheral house-building, but economic barriers such as the long periods of recession (1980 - 83 and again from 1987), high real rates of interest, reduced inflation and hence reduced value of home-ownership as an investment, and finally less favourable taxation and mortgaging rules for ownership

S. Illeris
Why was the Central City Population Stabilized?
The Case of Copenhagen

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

housing from 1987. In brief: When people cannot afford to have new houses built, they have to remain in the old ones!

This hypothesis probably explains the variation in the migration balance of the peripheral counties. Indeed, in the boom period in the mid-1980s, when house-building increased somewhat, net migration into the periphery as well as out of the older and newer suburban rings increased, too. If this hypothesis is correct, net migration into the periphery may pick up again if and when economic conditions for house-building improve.

Conclusion

The above discussion points towards the following factors behind the stabilisation of the Copenhagen central city population since 1980:

- The thinning out of the old population of mid-age and elderly blue collar workers and housewives has now reached a stage where the "reservoirs" are almost empty.
- An increased attraction of persons aged 20-34. A certain rejuvenation has taken place. Some of these people are well-to-do ("gentrification"), but more are under education, "social losers", or international immigrants.
- Economic and legal stimuli for the construction of new ownership housing in the periphery have been reduced, forcing people to remain in the existing housing stock.

On the other hand, the hypotheses were rejected that either saving of energy costs or urban renewal and house-building on derelict land should play important roles.

The above-mentioned factors combine in a unique way in each metropolitan region. The explanations found in the Copenhagen region cannot be generalized without an individual examination of each case.

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TORONTO'S UNDERGROUND CITY: EXCAVATING THE TERMS OF ACCESS

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Among the most serious urban problems in Canada over the past several decades has been the erosion of traditional streets where public life transpired. Much of the county's civic life now occurs on privately-owned, publicly-used places: above- or below-ground pedestrian ways, atria, office/retail complexes and shopping malls. The privatization of public places has heightened concern about surveillance, discrimination, accessibility and public safety. Similarly, the publicization of private places has intensified anxieties about adequate social control, loss of autonomy and public interference in the operation and management of private business premises. Achieving an equitable balance between public and private rights and obligations, while promoting and maintaining both commercial and community interests, must be achieved if the animation, flexibility, and freedoms conventionally associated with the street are not left outside. How to meet this challenge?

Toronto's "underground city" (TUC) - the ten kilometres of linked retail tunnels below the downtown core - exemplifies this new "indoor street" and is the site of this geographical excavation. Because spatial access structures the degree of publicness and privateness of a place - which in turn assists in organizing the social environment of a place - how, why and by whom access to TUC and its array of activities, civic amenities and resources is administered, contested and negotiated is the focus. Excavating the terms of access will provide a framework for critiquing the emergent problems, proposed solutions and the social implications for TUC and other cities grappling with underground and indoor issues.

Canada's sidewalks are changing; they are moving indoors onto private property[1]. The automobile, the skyscraper, the dispersed suburb and the shopping mall have contributed to the demise of a vibrant, pedestrian-oriented, outdoor street life in our city cores. Much of the country's civic life now occurs indoors on privately-owned, publicly-used places in the form of above-ground 'skywalks' between buildings, ground-level office/retail complexes, atriums and shopping malls, and below-ground, shop-lined tunnels. The privatization of public places has heightened concern about excessive surveillance, potential discrimination, universal accessibility and public safety. Concomitantly, the publicization of private places has intensified anxieties about inadequate social control, loss of autonomy and public interference in the operation and management of private business premises. Achieving a just balance between public and private rights and obligations, while promoting and maintaining both commercial and community interests, is a challenge that must be met if we are to ensure that neither the animation, flexibility, and freedoms conventionally associated with the street, nor the economic livelihood of shopkeepers, are left outside. It is this search for equitable public and private rights, reasonable rules of social conduct and a just code of access that is the focus of this piece on Toronto's public/private space interface.

Toronto's "underground city" (TUC) - the ten kilometres of tunnels beneath the downtown core, lined with some 1,100 shops and services, and used daily by 100,000 pedestrians (City of Toronto 1993; FULFORD 1993: 29) - exemplifies this new "indoor street." It is at the forefront of the public/private space debate and is the site of this geographical excavation. The underlying supposition, which both inspires the author and provides the basis for the critique to follow, is the ideal of a truly public place: a spatially unrestricted communal meeting ground for all members of our pluralistic society, a site for what HARVEY calls the "heterogeneity of open democracy" (1992: 591). Such a place, I maintain, is threatened by the move indoors and underground unless the existing social and legal relationships between private property owners and public users are challenged, alternative modes of spatial control are implemented, and a more balanced distribution of power is realized.

Sharing an "indoor street" raises a multitude of issues for society. For human geographers, the crux of the problems arising from the public/private space interface may be viewed as a territorial conflict: a power struggle among numerous agents with varying interests over the boundaries demarcating spatial control. From this perspective, access is the key issue. Access structures the degree of publicness and privateness of a place which plays a major role in the organization of its social environment (BENN and GAUS 1983: 5). By identifying how, why and by whom access to TUC and its array of civic amenities and activities is organized and currently contested, an understanding of the dynamics of the emergent problems, their principal agents and interests, and the potential avenues for reaching a more equitable distribution of power will be exhumed and discussed. Although Toronto's "underground city" is unique in the sense it is at the centre of the public/private space debate in Canada, it is, as will be shown, indicative of a growing world-wide trend toward indoor cities and the privatization of civic space.

No air photograph or traverse atop a downtown city street will reveal Toronto's underground city. It is, from above ground, a hidden geography, but it is by no means a geography exclusive to Toronto; Montreal has in excess of fifteen kilometres of underground city with access to approximately 1,600 shops and services (BOIVIN 1991: 83; London Free Press 1993). There are at least eighty-three other cities in North America with some form of above- or below-ground pedestrian networks within the central core (MAITLAND 1992: 162). Asia and Europe also possess large expanses of publicly-used, underground space. Japan, for example, has over 800,000 square metres of publicly accessible underground space (ISHIOKA 1992: 337), including more than seventy-six underground shopping malls (TATSUKAMI 1986: 19). Tokyo, alone, had more than fifty underground space projects proposed or in progress by the early 1990s (WADA and SAKUGAWA 1990: 33). Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, and Norway, for instance, also have underground projects, ranging from a 1000-seat concert hall, sports facilities and swimming pools, to a central bus terminal[2]. Toronto's underground city is certainly unique given its size, scale and intensity of pedestrian use, but it is part of an indoor geography that is international in scope and one fast becoming an integral part of the contemporary

urban fabric of major cities. The move underground in Toronto and elsewhere has become technologically feasible, spatially advantageous and economically attractive[3].

Toronto's pedestrian walkway, as illustrated in Figure 1 on the last page, currently covers the equivalent of roughly twelve city blocks in length and six blocks in width. It connects at least sixty-three different buildings, including more than twenty parking garages, nineteen shopping malls, five subway stations, four hotels, the Stock Exchange and City Hall (JONES et al. 1990: 17). The rapidity of its growth over the past three decades and the plans for future extensions would suggest TUC is a success, but for whom? There are pressing questions about precisely who benefits, who does not, and how Torontonians in particular, and Canadians in general, might equally share the benefits and burdens of moving civic life inside and underground.

The advantages are, aside from the spatial and economic efficiency as noted above, numerous for both the proprietors and users of the premises. For the former, there are potential monetary savings through reduced energy and maintenance costs relative to above-ground structures by virtue of occupying space that is enclosed, subsumed in earth, and insulated from the natural weathering elements of sun, wind, precipitation and seasonal and daily temperature fluctuations. Security is both enhanced and simplified by the limited number of access points and their perpetual surveillance by video cameras[4]. The passageways are, most importantly, a major source of revenue. In the tunnels, or "cashacombs" as RELPH calls them (1990: 80), pedestrians are quite literally a captured market. These monetary reasons alone are incentive for developers to build indoor and underground sidewalks, and are, in a market-driven, capitalist society, the primary reason for their construction[5].

For the pedestrian, the conveniences are profuse: ease of mobility on the tiled, well-lit and climate controlled corridors; direct access to public transit; proximity to hundreds of stores, services and work places; isolation from the traffic, noise, exhaust and potential physical harm of motor vehicles; a clean environment with innumerable plants, fountains, benches, pay phones and rest rooms[6]. There is the sense of security generated from being indoors, a space guarded by video cameras and removed from the panhandlers, leaf-letters and tumultuous crowds of the streets outside. The convenience, protection and amenities of such an enclosed and controlled space are, one suspects, sufficient cause to entice pedestrian use. Despite these and other advantages for both proprietor and pedestrian, such built environments come with qualities both troublesome and dubious.

For the operators there are responsibilities to both tenants and the public users. These premises, like all businesses, need to operate in a safe, functional and pleasing environment to promote and sustain their economic viability. Ensuring the safety of property, patrons and employees, maintaining acceptable levels of cleanliness and building maintenance, conforming to various municipal, provincial and federal laws, such as building codes, fire safety standards and human rights, present challenges for even the smallest of business establishments. Successfully fulling these obligations in a private place of business that, by virtue of its position in

Figure 1

Toronto's Downtown Walkway
The Underground City

PATH Walkway
Proposed Walkway
Subway
Buildings with links to the PATH

0   100   200
Metres

Produced by: The Cartographic Section, Dept. of Geography, U.W.O., 1994

a large, interconnected network of pedestrian corridors, is a public thoroughfare presents a problem that, although familiar to all businesses, is unequaled in scale: how to delimit, promote and maintain acceptable behaviour from the public to ensure the proper functioning of the privately-operated business premises?

For the public user there are a host of drawbacks, ranging from concerns with personal health and well-being to inconvenient design amenities and the potential loss of civil liberties. Being indoors and underground may generate negative psychological and physiological effects for some people, particularly those who work inside on a regular basis (CARMODY and STERLING 1987: 59-60). Lack of exposure to natural sunlight may encourage depression, and the absence of an exterior view may generate a sense of isolation, oppressive feelings of enclosure, phobias of confinement and perceived or substantiated fears of entrapment during fire or other potential calamities (WADA and SAKUGAWA 1990). The very notion of descending "underground" has disturbing connotations of dampness, death or burial for some, including perhaps, the owners of TUC who chose to call their corridors not the underground but the "PATH: Toronto's Downtown Walkway" (FULFORD 1993: 31; RINGSTAD 1994). Indoor air pollution, whether particulate from synthetic materials, radon gas released from the stone and concrete building materials or simply mould from air conditioning, may induce fatigue or illness if ventilation systems are incompetent. Indoor noise pollution, created by the presence of people, piped "muzak" and water fountains reverberating down the hard, tiled, and shiny surfaces of the tunnels, may induce temporary or permanent hearing loss, negative physiological and psychological reactions and impede social relations[7]. The design of TUC has, like other underground cities, been criticized for being inaccessible to the physically challenged due to a dearth of ramps and elevators, difficult to orient oneself relative to the world above due to few direct, visible, vertical links with the outdoors, and confusing for lack of adequate directional signage (BROWN 1989: 81; FULFORD 1993: 29-31; RELPH 1990: 83). Visibly stated rules of conduct are also sparse and limited to notices of hours of operation and "no soliciting". This latter sign is the only declaration, implicit as it is, that the corridors are under predominantly private control. Although the public's submission to private authority upon entry into a place of business is a culturally accepted, legally sanctioned and everyday occurrence, the domination by private interests of such a large and intensely-used site of civic life is unprecedented.

Moving indoors and underground clearly has differing advantages and disadvantages for proprietors and users, but they do share a common problem: spatial control. The proprietors must maintain an atmosphere conducive to business, which necessitates prohibiting those members of the public and activities they perceive as detracting from this objective. Given the high intensity of public use in these corridors, maintaining the desired level of spatial control may be problematic. This level of control over the public's activities and composition in a civic thoroughfare by private agents may be perceived by some members of the public as itself problematic if access is discriminatory and rules of conduct unduly restrictive.

The corridors have become a site of territorial conflict because they are a space both public and private. The boundaries demarcating private space from public space have become blurred: privately-owned business corridors have become publicly-used civic thoroughfares; publicly-used civic thoroughfares have come to occupy privately-owned business premises. Control over this public/private space interface has become a complex issue, but why, for whom, and by what means might this strife be resolved?

At issue is the division of control over the corridors between private and public agents, specifically over the power of exclusion granted and exercised by the former. The dynamics of the conflict are immediately compounded by the number of competing private and public agents involved with differing opinions, varying concerns and disparate levels of power. To speak of private and public interests is to amalgamate a multifarious collection of individuals and institutions into two broad camps. The plurality of these groups notwithstanding, the rudimentary dynamics of the conflict over exclusion may, for the sake of simplicity, be reduced to questions of private and public rights, obligations and interests, which necessarily leads one into the realm of law and the quest for territorial justice.

Fundamental to this territorial conflict is the ideal of private property and the rights and obligations embodied therein. Under Canadian law, a public place is "a place where the public goes, a place to which the public has or is permitted to have access and any place of public resort" (VASAN 1980: 302). The corridors of TUC are legally public places, but they are not public property. On private property - regardless of the intensity of the public's use of the premises - rules of access and conduct may be determined and enforced in part by the owner as prescribed by government and the courts through private property rights (MARTIN 1987: 39-50). With the possession of property come, however, obligations. These restrictions are founded on the principle that there is an inherent public interest in private land. This tenet provides the basis for instituting government legislation that regulates and limits private property rights (e.g., building codes, taxation, zoning bylaws). In short, this bundle of obligations imposed by governments is a formal recognition that public space is a shared space.

The public, in kind, has its bundle of rights and obligations, ranging from those which are constitutionally entrenched to those implicitly understood as cultural norms. Canadians have, for instance, the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of "expression," "peaceful assembly," and "association" which may be used to challenge private codes of conduct on the grounds they violate these freedoms (Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982). There are also numerous liberties that are sanctioned and maintained by traditional social norms, such as the freedoms of use and action, temporary claim, and presence (LYNCH 1981: 205-220; CARR et al. 1992: 137-186). One may, for example, use the facilities of a public place as long one does not appropriate them for exclusive personal use or deny others the same freedoms. People also have the right to simply "be," to simply partake in civic life, as long at they conform to the legally entrenched rules of public conduct and the cultural-specific civilities of social intercourse. In order to "be," however, to participate in

public life, one has to have spatial access to public places. Access to space is, therefore, fundamental to the fulfillment of these spatial rights and many of our other democratic freedoms.

Rights and privileges for both the private property owner and the public come, consequently, with controls or limitations in the form of obligations. The primary obligation of both parties is to exercise their respective spatial freedoms without infringing upon or abusing the spatial rights of others. Conflict has arisen over TUC because the spatial rights and freedoms of individuals, groups or institutions within each camp are perceived as a real or potential threat to the spatial rights or freedoms of the other. The rapid growth of the underground city in Toronto in particular and indoor space in Canada in general has surpassed the pace at which society has been able to address the issue of spatial control and the exercise of rights and obligations, but progress is being made. There are several modes available for legitimately challenging the existing spatial power distributions within TUC, and these have been exercised with varying degrees of success.

If ownership of the disputed corridors is transferred from the private to the public realm, then the public/private space interface ceases to exist and with it, the conflict over control. The tunnels could be policed, serviced, maintained and regulated like any other publicly-used, publicly-owned outdoor city street (BROWN 1989: 79). Although governments could acquire these lands through expropriation or purchase on the open market, the costs involved - both in terms of public expense and political fallout - deem this an extremely unlikely, unfeasible and perhaps naive solution to the problem. This also assumes, of course, that municipalities wish to acquire the premises, a responsibility Toronto City Hall has not expressed a desire to undertake (MORGAN 1994). Acquisition of private property by the public sector is one possibility for resolving the problems of spatial control but is an unlikely route due to its Draconian nature and the costs incurred.

Challenges to the existing division of power may also be undertaken through the courts. For example, a dispute arose in 1984 between Cadillac Fairview Corporation - part owner of Toronto's Eaton Centre - and the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union over the union's right to distribute information about joining the union to Eaton employees (GLOBE and MAIL 1989). According to one witness, union members merely stood in the publicly-used corridors, greeted employees with a "good morning" and handed out leaflets informing them of a forthcoming meeting; there were no placards and no boisterous activities (LAYTON 1989: 9). Cadillac Fairview called the police and had the union members charged with trespassing on private property.

The union challenged this charge and five years later the Supreme Court of Ontario ruled "the right of workers to meet union organizers is more important than a company's right to protect its private property from trespassers" (GLOBE and MAIL 1989). Although this may be regarded as a victory of public rights over private rights, such case law may be so specifically taylored to particular situations, in this instance the Eaton Centre and the right to organize unions, that such rulings hold little, if any,

relevance for other cases and places. In addition to the questionable applicability of the precedence set by individual case law, judicial proceedings are expensive and time consuming. Unlike unions, few individuals - particularly the most marginalized among us - have the time, money and resources to mount a successful legal challenge against private agents in the courts. These drawbacks aside, litigation does provide an opportunity to resolve specific issues between public and private agents with particular attention paid to the rights and obligations of each.

Governments, as noted above, wheel an immense amount of authority over the allocation of spatial power, and may, consequently, be very effective instruments of social and spatial change through passing new statutes, retiring others or modifying existing ones. For example, as Ontario's Trespass to Property Act (TPA) currently stands, private property owners have, in effect, the right to expel others "at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all" (ANAND 1987: iii). The potential for abuse - be it unwarranted restrictions on acceptable public behaviour, excessive surveillance or discriminatory expulsion based on real or perceived age, economic position, ethnocultural heritage or sexual orientation - is considerable and comes with little, if any, effective accountability. As a direct outcome of concerns initiated by the public over unduly restrictive and discriminatory enforcement of the TPA by owners of Toronto's underground city, the Attorney General of Ontario appointed a task force in 1986 with the mandate to investigate this allocation of power (ANAND 1987). This human rights probe reached several conclusions: among them that some private property owners discriminate against visible minorities, youth and other individuals deemed undesirable; the current law does not distinguish different types of private property and the intensity of the public's use; and invocation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as a defense from expulsion only addresses symptoms of the problem and not the unrestricted authority to exclude patrons that is the cause of the problem. As a result the Government of Ontario proposed amendments to the provincial petty trespass act that would have, if enacted into law, limited the expulsionary powers of private property owners while providing a mechanism for defining "reasonable use" by the public in a case by case, space by space, fashion. This bill failed to pass due to a variety of reasons, including lack of political will on the part of the provincial government, intense opposition from the shopping mall industry and small businesses, and a lack of consultation among the parties most effected by the proposed amendments (FRAM 1994). Nonetheless, legislation remains one of the most effective ways of redistributing power by mandating access and codes of conduct in civic places[8].

Involving the government, whether the legislative or judiciary branch, is not the only route available for resolution. The immediate parties involved may dialogue directly with each other to solve a mutual problem. Metropolitan Toronto Police - the public agent - and the owner's of the Eaton Centre - the private agent - are currently experimenting with a new model of sharing spatial control[9]. Because of the high number of requests for police in the Younge-Dundas district, which includes the Eaton Centre, Metro Police have recently introduced foot-patrol officers to the area.

With permission granted by the landowners, the police office located inside the shopping mall in a position of high visibility. Not only do police service the immediate corridors of the Eaton Centre, more importantly, they have close proximity to a neighbourhood in need of their presence. In theory, both the public and the private sectors gain. Eaton's gets, in addition to its private security force, public police presence to both deter and apprehend offenders, and the public, both mall patrons and neighbourhood residents alike, receive added police protection. In practice, however, problems may arise over precisely how the patrons, the police and private security - acting as servants of the landowners - interact. The presence of publicly-funded police officers on privately-owned property may, for example, lead the common layperson to conclude the general corridors are truly public property and behave accordingly, only to be informed otherwise by private security guards. Altercations could develop from the misunderstandings generated by this enhanced blurring of the public and private domains. Although this particular joint public/private venture is too premature to evaluate, such a process of consultation and cooperation seems well suited to the search for common ground and the spirit of sharing public space.

The search for an equitable distribution of rights and an acceptable code of access to Toronto's underground city is, upon excavation, a quest for territorial justice. How Canadians chose to distribute the benefits and burdens of spatial control inside the corridors of our emergent indoor cities is a morally-charged, ideologically-laden question of social justice[10]. Clearly the emergence of large expanses of publicly-used, privately-owned space is modifying the spatial structure of our cities, but changes to the social and legal organization dictating these indoor spatial structures - be it through acquisition, litigation, legislation, and/or consultation - are lagging behind. Maintaining the current distribution of spatial rights and obligations is socially unjust insofar as the needs of both the public and private agents are not being met. Notwithstanding the needs of business for premises conducive to commercial enterprise, the power of exclusion held and exercised by the private sector threatens the public's need for access to civic space. The right to simply "be," to partake in civic life, is prerequisite for the creation and sustenance of shared experiences, a sense of community and belonging. To lose a communal meeting ground - the pedestrian space - on the basis of private property rights, market forces and the desire of certain classes to associate with their own kind, is to lose the very site which embodies the best of Western culture: a truly public place where the democratic ideals of tolerance and equality are openly practiced and sustained through the inclusion and interaction of people on the streets and sidewalks of our pluralistic society. During the decades ahead as our indoor geographies expand, Canadians should not become passive witnesses to yet another erosion of the traditional street; the civil liberty conventionally associated with public life itself: the freedom to just be. As we move indoors and underground, do we really want to leave this civic identity outdoors and above ground?

NOTES

1. A longer, more in-depth version of this paper, entitled "Excavating Toronto's Underground Streets: In Search of Equitable Rights, Rules and Revenue," may be found in the following forthcoming book: CAULFIELD, J. and PEAKE, L. (in press). Critical Perspectives to Canadian Urbanism. Toronto: University of Toronto.
2. The Retretti Art Centre, in Punkaharju, Finland, contains a 1000-seat concert hall built underground in rock (ANTTIKOSKI et al. 1989: 17). Germany has an underground canteen in Bonn and numerous below-ground shopping arcades such as those in Cologne and Dusseldorf (KIND-BARKAUSKAS 1993: 25). In an effort to reduce traffic congestion in Amsterdam, there is a proposal to build an underground bus terminal that would accommodate up to 50 buses (SIKKEL 1993: 33). Underground sports halls and swimming pools have been constructed and are widely used in Norway (BROOK and COLLINS 1990: 8).
3. Over 95 % of the cost to erect a building in central Tokyo may be attributed to the cost of land acquisition (BROOK and COLLINS 1990: 8). At these prices, going underground to avoid purchasing more surface space is attractive.
4. Of the 2.5 million calls for service received by Metropolitan Toronto Police in 1993, only 67 criminal offenses or serious occurrences (i.e. suicide) were investigated by the Force in the underground city (DEAR 1994).
5. A 1991 survey of North American municipalities with an indoor city indicated commercial advantage was the single largest factor driving its construction (MAITLAND 1992: 165).
6. Although the vast majority of the underground resembles a suburban shopping mall corridor, there are parts that possess no stores or services, such as the link between Union Station and The Royal York Hotel, and sections that are murky, such as the underground parking garage which links City Hall to the rest of the underground city.
7. For a case study of the potential auditory, physiological, psychological and social effects of ambient noise on indoor-city patrons see HOPKINS (1994).
8. For a in-depth discussion of the now defunct proposed amendments to Ontario's Trespass to Property Act see HOPKINS (1993). For a critique of a newly proposed category of quasi-public property ownership, which recognizes the essentially public nature of mall space while retaining reasonable rights for property owners, see KRUSHELNICKI (1993).
9. This account is based on an interview with Sgt. COCKSEDGE (1994) and correspondence with the Director of Corporate Planning (DEAR 1994), both with Metropolitan Toronto Police.
10. For a succinct overview of social justice see SMITH (1994a). For an in-depth review of the topic as it relates to geography see SMITH (1994b).

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THE INTERPRETATION OF SEA IN URBAN PLANNING AND EVERYDAY LIFE: THE CASE OF HELSINKI

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The problem of this study is how nature is defined in the city. The questions of nature have been widely neglected in urban geography. In recent years the discussions of environment and sustainable development have increased the interest to nature in urban studies. In this project this broad question is focused to the city and its relation to the sea. The waterfront can be seen as a reflection of society's relation to the nature. The making of built environment and urban life in new urban areas are processes of power. In the case of waterfronts the meaning of nature is manifested in arguments concerning city's and citizens' relations to the sea.

The city of Helsinki lies on the coast. Therefore the sea and the planning of Helsinki are entangled together. The development of Helsinki's waterfronts is related to the wider processes of recent changes in location strategies in shipping and industry. The land-use of waterfront-areas is under redefinition. The public interpretations of nature and sea will be studied through analysis of planning documents of Helsinki.

The empirical focus of this study is a waterfront housing project near the centre of Helsinki. In this area, Ruoholahti, which is planned by the City Planning Department, the analysis of private interpretations of nature and sea is done by depth-interviews of residents of this area. In these interviews personal relations to nature and personal housing history are concerned important when studying the meaning of urban nature.

Key words: Waterfront, City, Nature, Helsinki

Introduction: Excavating the Nature in the City

The problem of this study has grown from the idea of urban nature. The conceptual categories of nature and environment have been neglected in contemporary urban studies. It is especially interesting that this has been happening in urban geography, inside the discipline of geography which traditionally examines the relationship between humans and their environment. One reason for this is the academic division of labor. In urban studies nature and environment have largely been seen as an scene for social events, not a problem itself. Problematization of nature has not been work for urban geographers.

In urban social geography the theorization has been emphasized on space and place. In these discussions of the problem between agency and structure social theorists have become aware of the meaning of space and geography for social life (GREGORY and URRY 1985; KOBAYASHI and MACKENZIE 1989). These discussions are only now beginning to proceed on the arena of nature.

The problem of nature in the city is an unexamined field in urban geography. Much of the urban geography has been dominated by spatial, quantitative and economical perspectives. Also in contemporary cultural geography the city has been seen from a socio-cultural perspective which has excluded nature from the social study of the

M. Karvinen
The Interpretation of Sea in Urban Planning and Everday Life:
The Case of Helsinki

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

cities. One reason for this could be the urge to be separated from historical-materialism. It has been argued that the modern environmental problems are culminated when we in our thinking separate the concepts of nature and culture. This process is conceptualized as alienation and through this process humans - as individuals - have become distanced from their natural origins (KATZ and KIRBY 1991: 263).

Operationalization of such a theoretical problem in one study is big challenge. I have approached the problem by studying the meaning of sea to Helsinki through history, as the sea has always been significant for Helsinki. This has been starting point in the study where the question of the nature in the city is studied through the case of Helsinki and sea. This problem will be analyzed from two different angles. The first part is the study of urban planning in Helsinki. In this part I concentrate on the public interpretations of nature and sea which are created in the sphere of planning. These interpretations can be studied through a discourse analysis of planning documents (for example KENNY 1992; TETT and WOLFE 1991). In the second part the aim is to study how the urban dwellers experience the relationship between city and sea. The empirical focus of the study is one of the Helsinki's new waterfront-housing projects, Ruoholahti. One possible method for collecting information of people's relation to their environment is depth-interview (BURGESS, LIMB and HARRISON 1988a, 1988b). The first part of the study is in preparation, the second phase starts in the end of 1995. The analysis of the interpretations from both parts of the study can possibly make visible the differences which cause conflicts in local urban planning. The basic questions are all focused into Helsinki:

- What is the interpretation of sea and waterfront in public urban relationship to nature?
- How is the Finnish relation to nature interpreted in the case of waterfronts?
- What is the meaning of sea in constitution of identity and in private relationship to nature?
- How are private experiences of nature filtered to urban life?

These are the main questions of the whole study. In this paper my purpose is to clarify shortly the theoretical ideas which have affected the study and then illustrate the particular place of Helsinki where the studied processes take place. In the end I present possible hypotheses for the empirical case study.

The question of waterfronts is widely discussed in geography and urban planning (e.g. HAHN 1993; HOYLE et al. 1988; PRIEBS 1992a, 1992b). Usually waterfronts are examined from the perspective of economy, image marketing or gentrification. In Helsinki the regeneration of waterfront differs from the big metropolises. First of all, the whole problematic of waterfronts came actual in Helsinki only in 1980s because until then there was enough land available for construction. Also the need for new port has become actual now and the discussion about the place of the new port is currently going on. This process releases areas from the inner-city waterfront. In the same time the legislative reforms concerning environmental impact assessment are

M. Karvinen
The Interpretation of Sea in Urban Planning and Everday Life:
The Case of Helsinki

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

influencing planning process. These make the questions of waterfront topical in Helsinki.

Theoretical Background of the Study

This study is part of a project in which the relationships of political and economical power to civil society and nature in the city are examined. The methodological background is inspired by British locality studies of the 1980s and their Finnish counterparts done in the early 1990s. However, the perspective has evolved into a more culturally sensitive direction. The discussion in Anglo-American cultural geography (e.g. BARNES and DUNCAN 1992; DUNCAN and LEY 1993) has given new perspectives also for the methodology in urban geography. This is important in times when the roles of subject and representation have been widely questioned. The universal subject of white, middle-aged, middle-class male is being taken apart.

How to study nature in the urban context with such premises in the domain of planning and everyday life? An important starting point for this study is nature as a conceptual entity. The aim is to study the interpretation and meanings of nature, not the physical nature. This can be compared to the process of understanding a book. It is done through interpreting the meanings of words, not analyzing their shape or frequency (SAYER 1992: 35).

In lay thinking nature is often considered as something which is not very visible in the city. This controversial argument reveals embedded ideals of western concepts of nature. Nature is usually seen as the opposite to city because city is something which humans have made. Also, it is not rare to draw a parallel between concepts of country and nature. In the previously mentioned juxtaposition city usually represents culture. Conceptual separation of nature from culture has happened when we have become urban beings (FITZSIMMONS 1989: 108). Nature is said to be one of the most complicated concepts of western culture. My purpose, therefore, is not to define the concept of nature in urban context but to find some particular interpretations through which it might be possible to develop our understanding of some urban problems.

In recent years nature and city has been dealt in many projects. William CRONON has studied city of Chicago and its relation to surrounding nature in a praised and criticized monograph (CRONON 1991, and his critics in Antipode theme number 1994, 26: 2). There is also interesting research on urban growth and its relation to environmental questions (CARLIN and EMEL 1992). In Odense, Denmark, a 5-year "Man and Nature" research program has been established. It includes projects concerning nature, urban history and literature (KRISTENSEN et al. 1993; Man and Nature 1993).

Urban planning is a powerful profession which combines political, economical and professional power in order to transform our environments. Planning can be analyzed in different ways. Traditionally planning has theoretically been divided into theories of planning and theories in planning (CAMHIS 1979). In this work planning is

M. Karvinen
The Interpretation of Sea in Urban Planning and Everday Life:
The Case of Helsinki

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

understood as an arena where values, opinions and targets are struggled and negotiated into form of plans or instructions. In other words, planning is a discursive field which is in continuous change. It is important to identify all the agents participating in the planning process. Then it is possible to analyze their arguments. This kind of work demands qualitative methods like discourse analysis (RYDIN and MYERSON 1989). However, the analysis of planning reveals only one side of the conceptions of urban nature. I have conceptualized this side as public interpretation of nature. Public is in this understood as the official view of society. The second sphere is the collective interpretations of nature. These are expressed in different forms of national culture. Traces of them can be found for example in myths, literature and art. This kind of material is not included in this study. However, some locally interesting examples can illustrate the particular problematic of the study area. The third interpretation of nature is a private one. It is constituted in the sphere of everyday life and done individually. This sphere is examined in the second phase of my study.

Some Aspects of Finnish Conceptions of Nature

In Finland the forest is a crucial element of nature and our images of it. Many artists from the time of nation-building are famous because of their portrayals and interpretations of Finnish forests. The music of Jean Sibelius is connected to our wildwood, painters Akseli Gallen-Kallela and Pekka Halonen have in their landscape paintings used forest themes. Finnish literature has also drawn ideas from forests and countryside. Urban milieu and cities, on the contrary, have inspired only few Finnish artists and writers. City is not a part of Finnish national landscape (ILMONEN 1992: 36). However, these myths are changing. Finnish Ministry of Environment published 1993 an illustrated book which listed 27 national landscapes and 5 of these were urban milieux (Ympäristöministeriö 1993).

The meaning of forest is important for the official image of Finland. The newly built residence for president of Finland is located on a forested cape in its own privacy a couple of kilometers from centre of Helsinki. The name of the place and the building is "Mäntyniemi" meaning "pine cape". The meaning of forest is highlighted also because of its importance to Finnish national economy. The developing of wood-processing industry is considered to be the only way to get Finland out of the economical crisis.

Late urbanization and low population density are also factors which condition Finnish concepts of nature. Major part of Finnish population has direct family ties to countryside. Many skills which are related to agriculture and hunter-gathering are familiar to Finnish urban people: fishing, hunting, berry and mushroom picking or making firewood. It has been argued that Finnish cultural relationship to nature is defined through benefit and therefore there is no difference between nature and "nature". There is only one nature (BENGS 1992: 75).

M. Karvinen
The Interpretation of Sea in Urban Planning and Everday Life:
The Case of Helsinki

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

This concept of nature was interpreted in urban planning in 1960s when the big migration from countryside to the cities happened. People whose ideas of life came from an agrarian society wanted to experience nature at their home door in the city. This problem was solved by building housing estates in the forest. It is possible to say that in Helsinki there is a invisible border between inland forest culture and coastal sea culture. In this controversial claim culture is quite freely defined. This separation is currently breaking when the urban waterfronts are having new importance as areas of housing. The dominant concept of the relation between nature and city is changing and urban planning is the sphere where it is legitimized.

Short History of Planning and Waterfront Land-Use in Helsinki

The location of Helsinki is derived from the authoritative order from the King of Sweden in 1550. In that time Finland was part of Swedish kingdom. Helsinki was established as a trading place to compete with Tallinn (Reval) on southern coast of the Gulf of Finland. Russia, Sweden and Hanseatic League were the forces which were competing in Baltic trade. Helsinki was originally located on the estuary of the river Vantaa. There was no economic base for living in Helsinki so the king had to order people from other towns to move into Helsinki. This policy was not successful and the early years of the city were a struggle for existence. Timber and wood were the main export goods, but they had to be transported from the inland. In 1640 the city was moved to its present place which was considered to be a better harbor.

In the beginning of the 18th century Helsinki was a little town with 1700 inhabitants. The waterfront of the built-up area was full of wooden storehouses and jetties. In the year 1800 there were 7000 inhabitants and built-up area was less than one square kilometer. Land-use on the waterfront became denser and landscape looked more "urban". Waterfront had no special social or aesthetic meaning. For example the slaughterhouse was still in the middle of the city on the waterfront. Industry began to grow slowly and the first dock was founded in those times. The rest of present Helsinki was countryside and only in few places on the waterfront forest and cliff was changed to fields and meadows.

In the middle of the 19th century the population had grown to 21 000. That time was the eve of industrialization in Helsinki and industry began to conquer city's waterfronts. The shipbuilding industry on the south-eastern side of the built-up area expanded. In south-west there was a brewery, in north-west a sugar factory and in north-east a ceramic factory. The facade of the city began to be appreciated and the slaughterhouse had to move on the edge of the city. Land-use on the waterfront was not anymore based on demand for water. Seashore became to have other uses and meanings. There was a hospital on the western shore of the city and near that was new cemetery. University had it's botanical garden just beside city's centre facing the Töölönlahti-bay. In southern point of the city's cape was Helsinki's first park on the shore.

M. Karvinen
The Interpretation of Sea in Urban Planning and Everday Life:
The Case of Helsinki

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

In the year 1900 port and railways had taken over the shores around city. There was more industry and the amount of population was 79 000. The main railway was built from the middle of the city's centre to the north. The city's harbor railway which goes around the cape of Helsinki was built in the turn of the century. The city was bordered by the railway and it was also a borderline between built-up area and the wasteland on the shore. Port activities were centered on the northern side of the town, which is separated from city's centre area by a narrow strait.

The first half of the 20th century was a time of fast growth for Helsinki. In fifty years the population grew to 368 000. Industry and port activities spread and more land on the waterfront was needed. Large areas of sea were filled in the south-western and north-eastern sides of the city's centre (KARIVALO 1976). This process has been going on up to these days but is now over because the new port is going to be outside city's centre. Although industry began to move out from the center in 1960s the waterfront areas were reserved to the end of the 1980s. Helsinki is the biggest port of importation in Finland and the growth of shipping kept the demand for port area in high level. In the middle of the 1970s city was worried about the decreasing population in the inner city and in the General Plan of Central City Area of 1976 one of the main goals was to stop that development. Waterfronts were noticed as a solution to this problem in the beginning of the 1980s when city examined alternative uses of shore areas. Recreation and housing have been the two competing alternatives. In housing the idea of welfare state and strong tradition of centralized planning have favored public housing. Therefore, private development corporations have not effected directly to the planning of the waterfronts. However, the unofficial contacts between city and developers are still unexamined.

The meaning of sea and waterfronts for the image of Helsinki became clear in the end of the 1980s. In the General Plan of 1992 one main theme for future development of the city is "Marine Helsinki". This idea is realized by developing the passenger port, building of the new housing areas, maintaining grand marine entry scenes and starting projects of ecological marine living.

Waterfront Projects in Helsinki

There have been several waterfront projects in Helsinki during last 20 years. First of the new waterfront housing areas was Merihaka, an artificial cape one kilometer north-east from city centre. It was built in 1970s. Merihaka was built as a modernist high-rise area in the style of big metropolises. There are the only 12- and 16-storey apartment blocks in inner city. The traffic was planned to be on two levels, cars on the first level and pedestrians on the second level. Merihaka has been criticized for its inhumane scale and unnatural, concrete environment. The waterfront itself is linear and right-angled. On one side there is a little marina.

The next project was in Katajanokka, an island which lies on the eastern side of city centre. In Katajanokka it is possible to find an urban milieu from the beginning of this

M. Karvinen
The Interpretation of Sea in Urban Planning and Everday Life:
The Case of Helsinki

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

century. It is also a part of Helsinki's passenger port with connections to Stockholm, Travemünde and Tallinn. On the waterfronts of Katajanokka there are warehouses from early years of 20th century. The new waterfront housing area was built in the end of the 1970s and in the beginning of the 1980s. The idea was to build dense urban milieu with contact to older parts of the area. There are 3-5-storeyed houses covered with red tile. Street and parking lots sever apartment houses from the quay and from waterfront park.

During the 1980s the construction of apartments was centered on north-east and east suburban areas of Helsinki. In the end of 1980s the next waterfront project started in Pikku-Huopalahti 5 km to north-west from city centre. It is an bay-area between the inner-city and suburbia. The first houses in new Pikku-Huopalahti were finished in 1990. In Pikku-Huopalahti the idea was to build an urban milieu with good environmental qualities. The coastline with promenade, square and cafe is reserved for inhabitants. The construction of the area is still uncompleted.

In Helsinki's eastern suburbs is one of the latest waterfront housing projects, Vuosaari. This area was non-built coastal forest. The project represents the new idea of building a typical Finnish forest-suburbia on the waterfront. The area is currently under construction.

Chronologically the next one is Ruoholahti which will be the case area of my study. This new waterfront housing area is going to be joined with the inner city and it is built on landfill. Until recently there has been industry, warehouses and port activities on the area. The regeneration process started in the early 1980s when planning of the area started by changing the land-use from harbor and stock area to housing purposes. The area is planned to form a single whole with old central city area. The idea of maritime city is carried out by building waterfront promenades and canal which halves the area. First blocks are ready but the building of the area continues to next decade.

There are other new projects which are just started or are under planning. In eastern suburbia is the area of Herttoniemi, a former industrial area from 1930s where the construction work started in last winter. In this project the idea of waterfront is still developed further. Two major waterfront projects, Arabianranta and Viikki, are under planning. The first one is an old industrial site of ceramic manufacturing. The construction is planned to start in nearest future. The second one, Viikki, is an area with potential of conflict. Viikki is a preserved bird sanctuary and the new housing is planned right next to it. New bio-technic science-park will also be built in the area. The original location of Helsinki is between these two project areas.

The Need to Analyze the Planning Process of Waterfronts

The public interpretation of nature in context of urban planning can be traced from planning documents, official records and other archive documents. In the case of

M. Karvinen
The Interpretation of Sea in Urban Planning and Everday Life:
The Case of Helsinki

Abhandlungen - Anthropogeographie
Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, FU Berlin
Band 52, Berlin 1994

Helsinki these processes can be followed through this century. The problem of defining a relevant time span for this study depends not only on the material but on the time when modern urban planning started in Helsinki. Finland was under Russian rule from 1809 until its independence in 1917. However, under Russian rule Finland had autonomy and thus independence was not a mark for new era in urban planning. However, for architecture it was meaningful, and the nation-building of that period changed a lot of Helsinki's street scenery. The first general plan which included whole city was made in 1911 which can be considered a starting point for modern planning in Helsinki. However, for a more detailed analysis of the urban waterfronts in Helsinki, a relevant time span of study could be from the General Plan of 1970 to these days.

In Finnish urban planning it is possible to find somewhat a colonial conflict. Finnish government traditions owe much both to Swedish and Russian rulers. The meaning of central administration is emphasized in Finnish culture. This administrative culture meets traditional Finnish culture of nature in cities, which were villages until last century. The lack of public discussion about planning projects is partly caused by this juxtaposition. Even in these days of negotiation planning the head of Helsinki City Planning Office has hoped that planning could be done in "windless space" i.e. without outside disturbance. This illustrates the viewpoints of the public planning and it also underlines the need for analysis of the planning process and the arguments which are used. If citizens are considered as troublemakers in planning process, their possibility to participate in defining of the nature in the city is threatened.

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M. Karvinen
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The Case of Helsinki

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URBAN DESTINIES - WHAT ARE THE TRENDS?

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Never before has the focus on urban issues been so perspicuos as today. The challenging questions are connected not only with the urban growth, but also with the environmental problems not at least created by the increasing use of the car. In the more and more dispersed urban landscape we require the mobility of the car in order to sew together the daily life. Thus, mobility is a crucial and necessary factor to analyse when we want to expand the theory of urban change and urban development.

Introduction

"In Sweden the average temperature is rather lower than we had like to be. And while our summers have a unique kind of beauty we can not pretend they are particularly long or hot. Nevertheless, at SAAB we have always had a passionate love affair with the convertible. It is not remotely logical."

I found this advertisement for the new SAAB 900 Convertible (open car) in the often cited publication The Economist May 1994. The ad ends with "In fact, we have only one regret. We wish we had your weather rather than ours".

Of course the company wants to sell as many cars as possible and this would also be good for the Swedish economy and for General Motors. But with more cars the greenhouse effect will develop at a faster rate and Sweden will reach a warmer climate sooner than is foreseen. At the same time, in countries or regions on lower latitudes the weather will probably be too hot for open cars. And we do not know how the rain pattern will be redistributed over the globe!

Let us agree upon that in the longer run, global structural aspects of this kind - a higher average temperature on earth - may create changes of a magnitude we can not even imagine today. This of course implies that we have drawn the right conclusions. As researchers are not at all of the same opinion neither about the factors behind the greenhouse effect nor the consequences, it is quite difficult to know what shape the future will take. However, there are quite many researchers, technicians, city planners, tourism advocates, investors, etc. in particular, who seriously discuss whether the consequences of e.g. a rising sea level will be of a negative or a positive character.

The ad also reveals questions of the relationship between the different scales - local and global - implying the individual's behavior and his or her responsibility for the surrounding environment. Summarized, all the individuals' car use and mobility give strong contributions to the increasing environmental global problems. The

increasing mobility of man all over the world, the increasing transportation of goods, the circulation of information and the borderless spread of emissions and substances and the impact of all these factors in a spatial-geographical sense are among the most urgent problems we must direct more attention to than we do today.

Which are the challenges?

Never before has the focus on urban issues been so perspicuous as today. The increasing urban population not at least in the developing countries, demands a foresight and a planning readiness of an unbelievable scale. On the other hand ... "some argue that we no longer need the kind of geographically concentrated, dense, economic combination of factories, and stores, surrounded by the homes of their workers, that we have come to think of as archetypal city" (SALINS 1993, p. 148). The increasing migration of not only people but also jobs and service out to the suburbs may indicate the decline of cities, which seem to be a phenomenon all over the world. But as SALINS continues: "... the city as an economic entity, the city as a more or less concentrated collection of businesses, homes, and institutions, interconnected by a dense and costly infrastructure of transportation, utilities, and telecommunications, is alive, well, and a permanent, indeed growing, feature of American life" (op.cit. 148). He also adds: "American cities can only be understood in connection with their suburbs, and the distinction between city and suburb is a false one". In Europe it has always been more common to have an integrated view of the city and the suburbs, for instance with respect to the web of public transport systems in order to facilitate for commuters to go to their works in city centres.

A more urgent problem in the developed countries are the consequences of increased car traffic which require decisions involving both drastic reduction of car use in cities and improvement of the public transport systems. An authoritative working group under the heading of a former manager at General Motors has at the request of the American Academy of Sciences been thinking of this problem and published a report in November 1992 with the title "Taming the Car and Its Users: Should We do Both?" *And* was underlined. The answer is yes (JOHNSON 1992).

Thus, which are the most challenging questions for geographers interested in urban change and urban development with special attention being paid to environmental considerations? That almost half of the world population in the year 2000 will live in a city or town? The problems of the mega-cities, cities over 10 million people? The necessity of substituting the big cities with middle-sized cities of around 250.000 inhabitants (HARDOY 1992)? Should we not continue more actively the process of integrating cities or towns into regional, national and international networks and in a deeper way start to analyze the amalgamation of the city and the surrounding countryside? "As places of work, cities have transformed from centers of goods processing to centers of information processing" as KASARDA (1993, p. 109) argues,

will this also give other possibilities of foot-loose location of where you want to live and work. What will be maintained in cities?

To summarize all these questions from a **theoretical** point of view, there seems to be an increasing interest in searching for a new meta-theory in order to explain the ongoing and the future urbanization process. As there are many doubts to work towards a 'grounded theory', which is rather difficult to develop, the meta-theory will be restricted to some clarifying concepts to elucidate the many processes going on in the contemporary society (cf. GREN 1994).

The main purpose of this article is to analyze the ongoing urban development and also speculate around the question of urban destinies, particularly in respect to how the situation develops in Sweden. To do that, I want to focus on the concept of **mobility** in order to stimulate a discussion on whether the increasing mobility in society may be used to foresee the next phase in the settlement pattern including both urban places and the countryside.

## Some trends in the Swedish urban development in the early 90s

The alteration of the over-all residential pattern in Sweden over the past 150 years is characterised by stability and change alike. While the population has almost trebled (from 3.2 to 8.7 million in spite of an immigration deficit of about 350.000 people), the basic residential pattern has, by and large, remained surprisingly unchanged. With the exception of the Stockholm region, whose share of the population has increased, the different parts of the country have retained approximately the same shares as before. Sweden has evolved a residential pattern in which 80 per cent of the population live south of a latitude drawn through Uppsala (see map in Figure 1).

Despite the stability of the main structure, major changes have taken place in respect to the number of people living in the various urban areas. In the 1830s, Stockholm had some 80.000 inhabitants, whereas other towns housed less than a couple of thousand people on average. Today, 90 per cent of the population live in densely-populated areas, towns and cities. One person out of five lives in one of the three major cities. The population decrease in rural areas has not infrequently been regarded as a source of concern due to diminished opportunities for land utilisation by way of farming and the potential lack of necessary foodstuffs if supplies from abroad are cut off. Recently, the desire to preserve an "open landscape" has featured in this context, too.

A new survey of rural agglomerations has recently been published showing the distribution of small places with 50-199 inhabitants (SCB 1993). A certain concentration to the surroundings of the big cities is clear, but otherwise they are well spread all over the country except from the mountain areas. Quite many of these agglomerations consist of summer cottages which have changed into permanent residence. During the recent recession this process has accelerated. In connection

with divorce it is also often the case that one of the parts may choose the summer cottage as a cheaper dwelling.

Figure 1   The population distribution in Sweden in 1990s

HIGH POPULATION DENSITY AREAS

Sweden's most densely populated areas lie in a number of belts or "ridges" and in a few "islands". (C6)

Luleå
Skellefteå

Half of the population of Sweden live within a distance of 30 km from the coasts of the North Sea and the Baltic.

Östersund
Umeå
Örnsköldsvik
Sundsvall
Söderhamn

Kalmar

Source: The Population. National Atlas of Sweden 1991

The distribution of the Swedish population on different settlement categories is shown in Table 1. Even if the rural agglomerations take only a small part of the total population in Sweden, they must be seen in the changing pattern of the urbanization process. The Stockholm county can be used as an example of this. Between 1961 and 1990 the Stockholm county had 1/3 of the total growth in Sweden and today the

county stands for about 20% of the Swedish population. The increase depended to 51% on the excess of births, 54% on net immigration and 15% on net migration from other counties in Sweden. Among the communities in Stockholm county the so called "green communities" increased most. During the 30 year period only the city of Stockholm lost population. Some of the communities which grew very fast during the 1970s and 1980s now loose inhabitants during the early 1990s.

Table 1 The distribution of the Swedish population in 1990

Category	Size	Number	Population
Urban localities	>200	1843	7.162.615 (83%)
Rural agglomerations	50-199	2362	252.000 (3%)
Sparsely populated areas			1.180.000 (14%)

Source: Statistical Central Bureau Na 38 SM 9301

Throughout Sweden there are quite many people leaving the metropolitan areas and densely built-up areas and taking up residence in the countryside. This development started during 1970s and has implied an increasing house-building in our smallest urban places. The changes between 1980 and 1990 show that in the country as a whole, the population in sparsely populated areas has increased with 2%. In the Stockholm county this population increased with 20% and the population in urban places with 7%. In absolute figures the urban places still gain most people. Of the total population growth the increase in the countryside in Stockholm county amounts to only 11%, but for certain communities to over 50%. For planners and politicians this development creates a real challenge, but they also have to discuss the explanation for this process. In most cases it is a question of permanenting summer cottages but also to concentrate new houses to existing farm areas, not at least for returning children of the farmers.

The prognosis is that this development will continue. The service base in the countryside is sufficient and all the time the infrastructure develops and the attraction of the countryside increases. But the car is absolutely necessary and with computer, telephone, fax and mobile telephone it is no problem to live and work out in the countryside. In Sweden there are about 300.000 persons working at home. Most of them are men in the age of 35-50 years and they collect, analyse and sell information of different kinds. Beside their rich equipment of electronic devices they are also characterized by a very high mobility.

In Figure 1 the densely populated areas in Sweden are identified. As in many other countries there are two features of significance. The "belts" with Stockholm as the starting-point and the other with Göteborg and Malmö as the main centres are reinforced the whole time. But the "isolated" islands also grow, particularly the cities

with higher education, universities or colleges. Another feature which also is similar to the pattern in many countries can be seen in the other map, where half of the Swedish population live within a distance of 30 km from the coasts of the North Sea and the Baltic. (On the global level around 80% of the population live within a two hour drive from the coast of the sea or a lake).

The above mentioned development of organizing cities into on the one hand networks of urban regions and on the other the policy of promoting the whole country including the sparsely areas to live, seem at first to be contradictory. However, these two policies coincide quite well with the two main international strategies of firstly to merit city and region endeavors the status of "Global City", and secondly to make places, communities, neighbourhoods and cities less dependent on global economic premisses and to develop local resources. Are these policies possible to amalgamate into one vision? The mobility of the people seems quite crucial in order to fulfil these aims, particularly when we have in mind the rather small Swedish population with on average 19 inhabitants per square km in addition to the modest population growth.

Mobility – an underestimated factor behind urban development?

Mobility is fundamental to all natural systems and in all cultures, although the changes inherent in it may take place according to varying spatial scales and rates. It seems also quite clear that all the ways of transferring goods, persons, and information have cooperated and supported one another. The increased opportunities for contact, mainly by way of the telephone network, have made for more complex production systems, but they have brought us increased personal contacts, too. Now, however, the question is whether we are facing the possibility of replacing some personal mobility by information transmission. We are already familiar with video conferences, the integrated computer, video cameras, and television. In future, physical removals might be rendered unnecessary by fictitious meetings in "technological spaces" or "cyberspace"! Will these fresh channels of information stimulate a new physical mobility on the part of persons and goods? What sort of impact are the various trends going to have on urban development and urban environment?

Like the urban developments of the past, future changes will take place along the spreading-out scale, attention being paid to production and consumption functions. Increased mobility has led to a continuous urban landscape across as well as within national boundaries. The evolution of the vast megalopolis has made the "problem landscape" more continuous. A larger number of people are affected by the environmental problems of cities. At the same time, this regional concentration creates a basis for long-distance transports, which may in time reduce the need for air transportation. However, regional concentration is offset by global spreading-out. There is a tendency for growing proportions of commerce to take place between

different urban landscapes within and between continents, generating comprehensive transportation.

More and more we have to focus on a fundamental theoretical research approach concerning the role of the city as one part in the regional, national and global, not only in the economic system but also in the ecosystem. ERIKSSON has raised the question: "Will the urban places and the rural areas change their roles in the future? Earlier the city has always been connected with the future and the countryside with the history. With high technology and a new and different wave of 'green' movers the rural areas will perhaps enjoy a renaissance" (ERIKSSON 1993:1). This question strongly stresses the geographical dimension of future studies which has attracted too little attention in public planning and administration.

FRÄNGSMYR (1980) argued that the future society in a geographical sense to a great extent was located to the city. There the vision of the "Efficient Society" was easier to realize and develop. The other utopia, "The Good Life", was more adjusted to the countryside, decentralization and local democracy. However, there are few who really believe in this second utopia, which means that man connected with it are not looking forward but are seeking earlier days of "good life". The future was regarded to belong to the city! But the conclusions drawn by some urbanists that the cities more and more have come to appear as an independent network in which the countryside is mostly apprehended as a distance-creating space between the nodes, seems to be rather narrow-sighted.

Mobility is governing the settlement pattern more than we first apprehend. But the structure is very complex and the relations between mobility and the geographical physical development are not at all obvious. It is almost a truism to argue that the relations consist of a loop - the spatial organization of residence, work places, service etc., influence our travels but the mobility in itself creates opportunities giving reinforced or new attraction points.

Almost everything in a modern society demand a very high degree of mobility by their citizens. Economic growth implies that every person can split his or her time to several places over the day and night. The supply of goods and service of different kinds is spread over the surface and the businessmen need as much people as possible to visit them and to buy. But also all other kinds of what we are offered today of service, education, recreation, etc., require us as costumers. In addition, the growing mass transport of tourists move people mostly to attractive places but in reality all cities and municipalities compete and try to get their part of the tourist stream.

Thus, man's increasing mobility creates strong forces in society. On the one hand global mobility and mass tourism contribute to change the world cities. On the other, and as a function of the growth of the global interaction by introducing new information technology and establishing global networks of different kinds, the local and regional face to face contacts and thereby the total mobility have increased over time.

How to meet this development? SUDJIC (1993) argues that it is impossible to work against the above mentioned forces and try to plan the big city in a direction against them. The same must be said about middle-sized cities, towns and the surrounding rural areas. It seems no longer possible to separate the development of urban and rural or of city and countryside (cf. SALINS op.cit.).

## An interwoven destiny of cities and countryside

Within the Committee on Spatial Development initiated by the European Union (EU) in the Maastricht agreement, Sweden has as one of the applying countries presented a first outline of a national spatial vision (Sverige 2009, 1994). Among the issues the Swedish group has focused on are "The urban system and the mobility" and "The cooperation between city and countryside". As a fundamental principle lies the maintenance of and the protection of the physical environment but also to economize with the natural resources.

As mentioned before, the dilemma of the cities is the decreasing population density and the dispersal of people, firms, services, recreational activities over vaster and vaster areas. The car is the bridging element but also one of the large environmental threats. Thus, the new systematic shift must contain the use of the car as it is still of extreme importance for our daily life and for the economy as a whole, but at the same time the environmental problems must not get worse.

The basic idea of the Swedish national spatial vision is to come back to the kind of nearness or closeness measured e. g. in terms of population density we once experienced in our cities and villages. But, also, more compact location of workplaces for service, small industries etc., is on the agenda. To make this possible involves among other presumptions a more developed integration of city and its surroundings in order to create a deeper mutual dependence, particularly concerning joint labor markets. This means further investments within the infrastructure, a reinforcement of the so called electronic highways included.

The geographical result of these assumptions appears on the map in Figure 2. These passages are called "co-operation arenas". To reduce the need of the car but also at the same time allow people to chose jobs within the whole passage, faster transport system, e. g. modern commuter track systems, are required. This vision implies a more rigid settlement structure and a much stronger governing of where to build new residential, industrial and service areas. And of course, we can have our doubts if the vision is plausible or not. Of all travels, a shrinking portion is the travel between the home and the work (today around 25-30 %). The increasing portion belongs to our "free time" travels, to service, recreation, education, visits to relatives and friends, etc. As these starting and goal points will be more and more dispersed, it seems rather difficult to satisfy them by public transport systems. Together with the permanenting of summer cottages as mentioned before, the individual mobility by car is in favour more and more in the future.

Figure 2   Co-operation arenas in Sweden

Source: Sverige 2009

Summary

The constantly increasing mobility in our modern society is a strategic trend with far-reaching implications for towns/cities and regions, not least from the environmental point of view. The observable emergence of the three major trading blocs of Europe, North America, and Asia will reinforce this trend. At the same time, these developments form an instructive example of how demands for, and circumstances favouring, continued economic growth clash with environmentally-adapted transport systems. Investments in infrastructure lend additional assistance to these tendencies. Beside the direct effects on the environment of the construction

and utilisation of new roads, a number of indirect effects arise and have to be dealt with. As the transport system is adapted to the needs of the environment, there will be a demand for lifestyle analyses as well as for research on the localisation of residential areas, workplaces, service functions, etc. The relationships between peripheral and central regions will be affected in a direction which may entail major difficulties for the periphery. Most studies suggest that in any relation between centre and periphery, the former gains at the expense of the latter. In this context, it is interesting to analyse the pros and cons of peripheral regions, as well as the ways in which they may be influenced by increased or reduced mobility respectively.

Furthermore, socioeconomic conditions play an important part when it comes to increasing insights into environmental problems and taking steps to deal with them. In the long term, increased mobility and a "network society" favouring the centre may erode the chances of societies (at the national, regional, and local levels) to develop a basic system of values which embodies greater consideration for our environment. One of the factors which might create conflicts and change values and loyalties is the mixture, within a region, of people anchored in global networks versus people whose "base" is exclusively local. This does not pertain to living conditions only; the question who causes emissions and discharges, and who is affected by them, is bound to arise, too.

Mobility is strongly connected with our use of the car, and to "tame" it and its driver, as the American report argues, seems to be the most urgent problem for urban researchers, politicians, and planners to analyse and find solutions for. As almost everything in our daily life in some way or another is dependent on high individual mobility, there are no easily acquired solutions. Changing attitudes and lifestyles, improved technology in the cars, more use of economic means, etc., are some required conditions. But in the longer run the role of the city, the relations between the urban and the surrounding rural areas and the future development of what the service society will result in of further flexibility and dispersed location patterns must be focused on to a higher degree. To foresee the implications of different "geographies" is one of our challenges.

NOTE

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