SIB Inductiofi. [chap. viii.

by a process which the common examples, ipostly drawn from instances already familiar to us, tend to let drop out of sight.

Let us take one of these familiar examples for closer examination; for instance, the favourite one:—This man is mortal, that man is mortal, and so on ; therefore all men are mortal. Now here it is obvious that the ' conception,' to use WhewelFs term, is one with which we are already familiar. The collection of attributes which make up what we stand in the abstract by humanity has been constantly united in the mind ; the group of objects denoted by the name 'man' has been constantly thought of as a луЬоЬ ; and this association has been powerfully aided by the influence of common language. Nobody, therefore, can see one of the objects which contain this collection of attributes without having the class recalled to him, or at least without having some of the individual objects which compose the class clearly separated off and brought before his mind. And similarly with regard to the attribute of mortality ; we are well acquainted with the nature and limits of its tion and denotation. The words ' man* and * mortal,' therefore, suggest to every mind the appropriate tions. Now though, as we have already seen, and as Avill be noticed again soon, there is still room even here for some ambiguity, this familiarity лvith the conceptions enormously diminishes the difficulty of making inferences. It pletely alters the character of that process, in fact ; so that instead of being like a drive to the right point over the open plain, where there is nothing to suggest our taking one line rather than another, it now resembles the choice of one out of a limited number of ruts which have been well worn and marked out by previous passers-by.

§ 36. A slight modification of the example will make it